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Notes
MEDIA ACCESS TO TAPE-RECORDED EVIDENCE
IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Courts in this country have long recognized the public's commonlaw right of access to judicial records and proceedings.' The exact parameters of this right are in dispute with regard to media access to taped
evidence used in criminal trials. 2 In Nixon v. Warner Communications,3 the

1. See, e.g., Fayette County v. Martin, 279 Ky. 387, 395-96, 130 S.W.2d 838,
843 (1939) (acknowledging common-law right of public to inspect records in
which interest is shown); Nowack v. Auditor General, 243 Mich. 200, 203-05,
219 N.W. 749, 750 (1928) (allowing newspaper editor access to public records in

possession of auditor general); Egan v. Board of Water Supply, 205 N.Y. 147,
154-55, 98 N.E. 467, 469 (1912) (permitting access to engineering reports concerning public contract); State ex rel. Nevada Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v.
Grimes, 29 Nev. 50, 82-88, 84 P. 1061, 1072-74 (1906) (acknowledging com-

mon-law right but finding it inapplicable to private realtor's request to copy all
private property records in order to compile set of abstract books); see also Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MIcH. L. REV. 971, 1164
(1975) (noting that right of citizens to inspect public records has its roots in
English common law).

Many states have codified this common-law right by enacting statutes governing access. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 66, § 10 (West Supp. 1986);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 116, §§ 43.6-43.7 (Supp. 1986); 1957 N.D. SEss. LAws 305.
However, state courts often exclude court records from coverage when there is a
statute governing access. See, e.g., New Bedford Standard-Times Pub. Co. v.
Clerk of Third Dist. Ct. of Bristol, 377 Mass. 404, 405, 387 N.E.2d 110, 112
(1979) (statute providing for public access to "public records" does not apply to
court records); Grand Forks Herald, Inc. v. Lyons, 101 N.W.2d 543, 545 (N.D.
1960) (statute providing for public access to records of public or governmental
bodies, bureaus or agencies of the state does not apply to county court records).
The landmark federal case recognizing the right of access and extending it
to judicial records is Ex Parte Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. 404 (1894). Drawbaugh
was a patent case in which the court rejected an appellant's attempt to seal the
records in his appeal. Id. The court stated that "[a]ny attempt to maintain secrecy, as to the records of this court, would seem to be inconsistent with the
common understanding of what belongs to a public court of record, to which all
persons have the right of access." Id. at 407. The Supreme Court recognized
the extension of the common-law right of access to judicial records in Nixon v.
Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). For a discussion of Warner
Communications, see infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
2. For a discussion of recent cases which have considered the common-law
right of the media to access to taped evidence used in criminal trials, see infra
notes 64-157 and accompanying text.
The issue dealt with in this Note-the media's common-law right of access
to tapes admitted into evidence at criminal trials-is a small part of a large controversy. The related issue of "openness" in criminal trials has long been the
subject of debate. The questions which arise are whether the public has a right

(183)
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United States Supreme Court refused to grant the media the right to
copy and broadcast the Watergate tapes. 4 Although the Court decided
to attend criminal trials, whether the public enjoys a right of access to pretrial
and post-trial proceedings and whether the trials can be broadcast live without
violating the Constitution. In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, the Supreme Court
held that absent an overriding interest, public attendance at criminal trials is
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980). Two years later in
Globe Newspaper Co. v. SuperiorCt., the Court held that the right of access to criminal trials secured by Richmond mandated the invalidation of a state statute that
required judges to exclude the public and the press from the courtroom during
the testimony of victims of specified sexual offenses who are under the age of
eighteen. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1982).
These two cases expanded the constitutional protections afforded the right of
access. For further discussion of these cases in the context of a disputed constitutional right of access to videotape evidence, see infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
In terms of access to pretrial proceedings, the Supreme Court has recently
held that there is a constitutional right of access to adversarial preliminary hearings. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986); cf Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (prohibiting dissemination of material obtained in advance of trial through discovery process); Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (recognizing constitutional right of access to voir dire proceedings for examination of potential jurors); In re Gannett
News Serv., 772 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1985) (restricting pretrial disclosure of matters considered in connection with motion in limine).
Courts have also dealt with the extension of the presumption in favor of
access to post-trial proceedings. See Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (11 th
Cir. 1983) (applying Richmond principle to post-trial proceedings and allowing
press access to prisoner lists submitted to court pursuant to request for injunctive relief; In re Application of CBS, 540 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (allowing
access to sentencing hearing); United States v. Carpentier, 526 F. Supp. 292
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (allowing access to sentencing hearing).
Another related question is the constitutionality of the live broadcast of
criminal trials. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981) (broadcast of criminal trials is not, in and of itself, unconstitutional); see also Barber, Televised Trials:
Weighing Advantages Against Disadvantages, JUST. Sys. J., Winter, 1985, at 279;
Note, Television Coverage of Trials: Constitutional ProtectionAgainst Absolute Denialof
Access in the Absence of a Compelling Interest, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1267 (1985); Note,
Cameras in the Courtroom: Guidelinesfor State Criminal Trials, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 475
(1985).
3. 435 U.S. 589 (1978). For a discussion of the facts of Warner Communications, see infra note 4.
4. 435 U.S. at 591. The "Watergate tapes" refer to some twenty-two hours
of taped conversations recorded in the White House Oval Office and in former
President Nixon's private office in the Executive Office Building. Id. at 594. The
Warner Communications Court overruled the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia to allow access to these tapes. Id. at 591.
In United States v. Mitchell, the D.C. Circuit had held that the party opposing access has the "burden of demonstrating that justice require[s] denying access."
United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom.
Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978). The Mitchell court went
on to state that, in terms of the Watergate tapes, the risk in allowing access
amounted to nothing more than a possibility of prejudice at a hypothetical second trial. 551 F.2d at 1261. Thus, the burden was not met and the court allowed access. Id.
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the case on statutory grounds, 5 it recognized the existence of the common-law presumption in favor of access. 6 The Court, however, failed to
7
enunciate a standard by which the presumption is to be gauged.
The Warner Communications decision left open several issues. Specifically, the Court did not definitively determine the scope of the media's
right of access to taped evidence. Since the Warner Communications decision, several federal courts of appeals8 have addressed the issue of the
The Supreme Court, in Warner Communications, did not explicitly or implicitly overrule the standards for determining the right of access set forth by the
D.C. Circuit. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 603. The judgment of the
Mitchell court was reversed on statutory grounds. Id. For further discussion of
the Warner Communications Court's analysis of the common-law right of access,
see infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the
Warner Communications Court's statutory analysis, see infra note 5. For a general
discussion of the Warner Communications decision, see Young, Supreme Court Report, 64 A.B.A. J. 891-92 (1978); Comment, All Courts Shall Be Open: The Public's
Right to View Judicial Proceedings, 52 TEMP. L.Q 311, 340-42 (1979).
5. See Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 603-06. The Warner Communications
Court held that the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, 44
U.S.C. § 2107 (1970) (the Presidential Recordings Act), governed access to the
Watergate tapes. See id. The Court further held that the Act authorized the Administrator of General Services to take custody of the tapes and documents and
have them screened by government archivists. Id. at 603. At that point, tapes
that were private in nature were to be returned to the President and those of
historical value were to be made available to the public. Id. The Court stated
that the existence of this administrative procedure created by Congress for
processing and releasing the tapes weighed in favor of denying access. Id. at
605-06.
6. Id. at 602. The Warner Communications Court stated that "on respondents'
side is the presumption-however gauged-in favor of public access to judicial
records." Id. The Warner Communications Court, as well as the courts of appeals
that have analyzed its decision, used the phrases "presumption . . . in favor of
access" and "common-law right of access" interchangeably. See Note, Media Access to Videotape Evidence in Criminal Trials, 4 COMMENT 445, 446 n.6 (1982). The
phrases are, arguably, not synonymous. Id. A presumption carries with it the
possibility of rebuttal, while a right generally does not. However, this Note will
follow the courts' practice of not distinguishing the phrases.
7. See 435 U.S. at 599. The Supreme Court stated: "we need not undertake
to delineate precisely the contours of the common law right, as we assume, arguendo, that it applies to the tapes at issue here." Id. The existence of the Presidential Recordings Act made it unnecessary for the Court to formulate a
standard concerning the common-law right of access. See id. at 603-06.
8. To date, seven courts of appeals have dealt with the issue presented in
this Note. See United States v. Webbe, 791 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1986) (denying
access to videotape evidence in criminal prosecution); United States v. Beckham,
789 F.2d 401 (6th Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Guzzino, 766 F.2d 302
(7th Cir. 1985) (allowing access to videotape evidence in criminal prosecution);
United States v. Martin, 746 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1984) (same); United States v.
Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1982) (denying access to videotape evidence
in criminal prosecution); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th
Cir. 1981) (same); In re National Broadcasting Co. (Jenrette), 653 F.2d 609 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (allowing access to videotape evidence in "Abscam" trial); United
States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981) (same); In re National Broadcasting
Co. (Myers), 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); United States v. Mitchell, 551
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media's right to copy tapes that have been admitted into evidence 9 at
criminal trials.' 0 In In re National Broadcasting Co. (Myers),'I the United

F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (allowing access to Watergate tapes in criminal prosecution), rev'd sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
9. There is currently disagreement among the courts of appeals as to
whether evidence must be admitted at trial in order to be considered a public
record. Compare United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 411 (6th Cir. 1986)
with United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 828 (3d Cir. 1981). Some courts
require admission into evidence before access will be allowed. See, e.g., Beckham,
789 F.2d at 411 ("The transcripts here were not public records. They were not
admitted into evidence, as were the tapes."); In re The Reporter's Committee for
Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (court stated that
Supreme Court, in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, considered admission into evidence to be determinative factor with regard to common-law right of access)
(citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 104 (1984)); United States v.
Guzzino, 766 F.2d 302, 304 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[The] right of access includes the
right of the media to copy ... tapes ... admitted into evidence .... "); United
States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1982) (only lawful way exhibits
in case could be made public was by admission into evidence in criminal trial or

some other public proceeding).
Other courts consider admission into evidence to be less relevant to the
question of access. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 746 F.2d 964, 968-69 (3d

Cir. 1984) (admission into evidence may be relevant factor but it is not dispositive); see also United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 828 (3d Cir. 1981) ("It
would unduly narrow the right of access were it to be confined to evidence properly admitted, since the right is based on the public's interests in seeing and
knowing the events which actually transpired."); Comment, supra note 4, at 337
(author defined right of access as extending to "transcripts, evidence, pleadings
and other materials submitted by litigants to the court"); cf In re National Broadcasting Co. (Jenrette), 653 F.2d 609, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (fact that tapes were

admitted into evidence and played to jury "weighed heavily" in favor of plaintiff's application).
The admission of evidence as a factor in determining access arises most
frequently in the context of whether transcripts of admitted videotape evidence
should be given to the media when the transcripts themselves have not been
admitted. In Beckham, the court denied access to the transcripts. 789 F.2d at
411. However, in Martin, the court allowed access to the transcripts. 746 F.2d at

968-69.
There is also a question whether the fact that the media have already gained
access to transcripts obviates the need for access to the tapes themselves. See,
e.g., In re National Broadcasting Co. (Myers), 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980)

("Though the transcripts of the videotapes have already provided the public
with an opportunity to know what words were spoken, there remains a legitimate
and important interest in affording members of the public their own opportunity
to see and hear evidence ....

").

Contra Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654

F.2d 423, 432 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that access to transcripts is indeed factor
to be considered when determining right of physical access to tapes).
10. Several courts have stated that the factors underlying access in criminal
trials apply equally to civil trials. See, e.g., Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796,
801 (11 th Cir. 1983) (allowing access to prisoner lists introduced pursuant to
injunction, based on public interest in release and incarceration of prisoners);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 896 (E.D.
Pa. 1981) (stating that Richmond principle of public access to criminal trials applies equally to civil trials). For a discussion of the issue of access in a civil setting, see Note, Constitutional Law-FirstAmendment-Rights of Access to Civil Trials,
23 DuoQ. L. REV. 1227 (1985).
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States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that there is a
"strong" presumption in favor of access and that only the most "compelling circumstances" justify denial.' 2 Three other courts of appeals
have accepted the Myers standard or have followed it in whole or in
part. 13 However, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth,
Sixth and Eighth Circuits have explicitly refused to embrace the Myers
view.1 4 To date, the Supreme Court and the remaining courts of ap15
peals have not yet adopted a standard.
This Note will examine the split among the courts of appeals concerning the strength to be afforded the common-law presumption in the
context of media access to tapes used in criminal trials.16 Part II reviews
the development of the common-law right' 7 and its constitutional un11. 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980).
12. Id. at 952. The Second Circuit stated that "it would take the most extraordinary circumstances to justify restrictions on the opportunity of those not
physically in attendance at the courtroom to see and hear the evidence" and that
"only the most compelling circumstances should prevent contemporaneous access to it." Id.
13. See United States v. Guzzino, 766 F.2d 302, 304 (7th Cir. 1985) (accepting existence of "strong" presumption but refusing to require "compelling
circumstances" in order to deny access); United States v. Martin, 746 F.2d 964,
967-68 (3d Cir. 1984) (expressing approval of Myers approach and recognizing
strong presumption); United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1293-94 (7th
Cir. 1982) (recognizing "strong" presumption but refusing to require "compelling circumstances" to deny access); In re National Broadcasting Co. (Jenrette),
653 F.2d 609, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that access should be denied only
if "justice so requires") (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1260
(D.C. Cir. 1976)); United States v. Criden, 648 F,2d 814, 823 (3d Cir. 1981)
(expressing approval of Myers approach and recognizing strong presumption in
favor of access). For a further discussion of the cases extending the commonlaw right of access to evidence used in criminal trials, see infra notes 64-122 and
accompanying text.
14. See United States v. Webbe, 791 F.2d 103, 106 (8th Cir. 1986) (common
law requires access to information about judicial proceedings and all evidence of
record, but right does not necessarily include copying tapes); United States v.
Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 414 (6th Cir. 1986) (agreeing that common-law right
extends to tape recordings, but disagreeing that only the most extraordinary
reasons justify restriction on this right); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654
F.2d 423, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1981) (expressing "fundamental difference" with Myers and noting that number of factors may militate against public access). For a
further discussion of the cases denying a right of access to evidence used in
criminal trials, see infra notes 123-51 and accompanying text.
15. Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 434 (5th Cir. 1981)
(noting that Supreme Court in Warner Communications did not draft explicit limits
or assign specific weight to common-law right of access); see also Note, supra note
6, at 449 ("Although the presumption in favor of access has long been recognized, its strength has not yet been clearly determined.").
16. For a discussion of the split among the courts of appeals concerning the
strength to be afforded the common-law presumption in the context of media
access to tapes used in criminal trails, see infra notes 64-151 and accompanying
text.
17. For a discussion of the development of his common-law right, see infra
notes 21-27 and accompanying text. See also H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO
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derpinnings. 18 Part III highlights the courts' conflicting analyses of the
factors considered determinative in decisions concerning access. 19 Part
IV concludes that the courts of appeals should follow the decision in
Myers and recognize a strong presumption in favor of access, thereby
allowing media access in the absence of substantial justification for
20
denial.
II.

EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS

A.

The Common-Law Right

The citizenry's right of access to public records is rooted in early
common law. 2 1 The right originated in England where the courts allowed access if citizens were able to show some legal "interest" in the
records.2 2 This right of access eventually became an essential part of

the judicial process in colonial America. 23 The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the right.2 4 In Warner Communications, the Court
noted that "courts in this country recognize a general right to inspect
135-36 (1953) (concluding that American public has long enjoyed right of access which developed
in early common law).
18. There is a question whether the right of access is grounded in the first
amendment. For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 48-63 & 154-74 and
accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the courts of appeals' conflicting analyses in this
regard, see infra notes 64-151 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the conclusion that the courts of appeals should
recognize a strong presumption in favor of access, and should, absent substantial justifications for denial, allow media access, see infra notes 175-222 and accompanying text.
21. See H. CROSS, supra note 17, at 135-36.
22. See, e.g.,
Browne v. Cumming, 109 Eng. Rep. 377, 378 (K.B. 1829) (law
concerning access "applies to all records where copies or exemplifications are
required for the purpose of being used as evidence"); see also Barrett, Freedom of
the Press, American Style, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY: ENGLISH AND AMERICAN
APPROACHES COMPARED 214, 238-39 (A.B.A. 1977). The interest test is not used
in American decisions. Rather, all citizens are deemed to have the same right of
access. See H. CROSS, supra note 17, at 137-52; 20 AM. JUR. 2D COURTS § 61
(1965) ("Court records are open to inspection not only by the parties directly
involved, but also by other persons who have a legitimate interest in such
inspection .. ").
23. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 567 (1980) ("We
have found nothing to suggest that the presumptive openness of the trial [in
England] . . . was not also an attribute of the judicial systems of colonial
America."). The Richmond Court referred to the openness of judicial proceedings as an "indispensable" element of the American trial. Id. at 569.
24. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349 (1966) ("The principle
that justice cannot survive behind the walls of silence has long been reflected in
the 'Anglo-American distrust for secret trials.' " (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 268 (1948)); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948) ("This nation's accepted
practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in our English
common law heritage."); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ("A trial is a
public event. What transpires in the court room is public property."); PenneKNOW; LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol32/iss1/5

6

Starczewski: Media Access to Tape-Recorded Evidence in Criminal Trials
1987]

189

NOTE

and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and
documents."'2 5 The rationale behind the recognition of the right of access is the belief that open trials enhance public understanding of and
alleviate public suspicion about the judicial process. 2 6 In addition,
27
openness promotes the fair conduct of the trial itself.
The right of access has been labelled as "fundamental, '2 8 although
there is disagreement whether the right rises to that level. 29 In United
States v. Beckham, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
recognized a fundamental right to know what transpires during judicial
proceedings. 30 The Beckham opinion was written in the context of media
access to videotape evidence. 3 1 According to the court, the fundamental right to know is satisfied if videotape or audiotape evidence is played
kamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 361 (1946) ("Of course trials must be public and
the public have a deep interest in trials.").
25. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 597 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the facts and opinion of Warner Communications, see infra notes 51-58
and accompanying text.
26. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980). The
Richmond court stated:
People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from
observing. When a criminal trial is conducted in the open, there is at
least an opportunity both for understanding the system in general and
its workings in a particular case.

Id.; see also 6 J.

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

§ 1834, at 438

(J. Chadbourn rev. 1976)

("[T]he educative effect of public attendance is a material advantage ...a strong

confidence in judicial remedies is secured which could never be inspired by a
system of secrecy.").
27. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (openness "gave assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants, and
decisions based on secret bias or partiality."). The Supreme Court commented
on the role of the right of access in the judicial process in Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). The Court stated:
Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards
the integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as a whole. Moreover, public access to the criminal trial fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public

respect for the judicial process. And, in the broadest terms, public access to criminal trials permits the public to participate in and serve as a
check upon the judicial process-an essential component in our system
of self-government.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
28. See United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd
sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978). The Mitchell

court stated that those requesting access "seek to vindicate a precious common
law right, one that predates the Constitution itself." Id. at 1260.

29. See United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 414-15 (6th Cir. 1986).
30. United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401 (6th Cir. 1986).
31. Id. at 403. For a discussion of the facts of Beckham and an analysis of the

court's discussion of the right of access, see infra notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
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in court and reporters are free to publish what they have heard.3 2 Thus,
according to the Sixth Circuit, there is no fundamental right of physical
access to the tapes themselves.3 3 This distinction is significant in that
the labelling of a right as fundamental implies first amendment protection and demands greater deference and stricter review by an appellate
34
court than a mere common-law right.
While the right of access initially applied only to written records,
courts have extended the right to include access to mechanical recordings. 3 5 Additionally, advances in technology have given new meaning to
the word "access." The availability of photocopying equipment
prompted courts to adjust the common-law right to include both the
right to inspect and the right to copy. 3 6 The use of mechanical recording equipment has further expanded the notion and effect of copying
32. 789 F.2d at 415 ("We do not believe a fundamental right is implicated
so long as there is full access to the information and full freedom to publish.").
33. Id.
34. Id. at 414-15. The Beckham court stated:
We find that, when the right to inspect and copy judicial records is
equivalent to the right to learn the facts on record, the fundamental
right to know is at stake, and consequently, the trial court's discretion
must be narrowly restricted. However, when the right to make copies of
tapes played in open court is essentially a request for a duplicate of
information already made available to the public and the media, then
the district court has far more discretion in balancing the factors.
Id. (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g.,
Menge v. City of Manchester, 113 N.H. 533, 311 A.2d 116
(1973) (court recognized right to copy magnetic computer tape); Ortiz v.
Jaramillo, 82 N.M. 445, 483 P.2d 500 (1971) (same); 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (1970)
(right to inspect court stenographer's notes or mechanical recordings as well as
transcript); Note, supra note 6, at 448 (right has not been limited to written documents, but includes computer tapes and audio tapes).
The question whether mechanical recordings (videotape and audiotape evidence) introduced as exhibits should be considered part of the public record
and thus included within the common-law right of access is answered in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 10(a) provides that: "[tihe original papers and exhibits filed in the district court .. .shall constitute the record on
appeal." FED. R. App. P. 10(a) (emphasis added). The rules also specifically
recognize nondocumentary exhibits as part of the public record. FED. R. App. P
11. Rule 11 (a) provides that the record, "including the transcript and exhibits
necessary for the determination of the appeal, shall be transmitted to the court
of appeals," and Rule 11 (b) provides that "physical exhibits other than documents
shall not be transmitted." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the judicial record includes videotape and audiotape evidence and the common-law right of access
applies to this type of evidence as well as documented testimony. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("We therefore hold that the common law right to inspect and copy judicial records extends
to exhibits.").
36. See, e.g.,
Moore v. Board of Freeholders, 76 N.J. Super. 396, 408, 184
A.2d 748, 754 ("To ignore the efficacy and practical worth of [photocopying]
equipment . ..would substantially impair [the] right to inspect and copy."),
modified, 39 N.J. 26, 186 A.2d 676 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1962); see also United
States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 823 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[Glenerally the right to
copy has been considered to be correlative of the right to inspect."); Myers, 635
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and raises a question as to the extent of "access" which should be allowed. 3 7 The impact on the public of a live videotape broadcast is far
greater than the impact of the printed word. 38 Consequently, some
courts have concluded that videotapes have a greater prejudicial impact
upon the criminal defendant than printed words.39 Other courts, however, have reasoned that the broadcast of tapes is a tool that enhances
public understanding of the judicial process and the proceedings of the
40
trial at hand.
While courts disagree as to the effect of the rebroadcast of videotapes, they generally agree that the common-law right of access is not
absolute. 4 1 There are situations in which the motive behind the request
for access or the sensitive nature of the recorded material mandates that
access be denied. 4 2 This decision is left to the discretion of the trial
F.2d at 950 ("[Tlhe nondocumentary nature of the evidence sought to be copied
does not remove the common law right.").
37. Some courts hold that presence in the courtroom coupled with the ability to report what is seen and heard constitutes sufficient "access." See Beckham,
789 F.2d at 415; see also United States v. Webbe, 791 F.2d 103, 106 (8th Cir.
1986) ("We think the common law requires access to information on judicial
proceedings and all evidence of record . . .but this right does not necessarily

embrace copying of tapes."). Other courts argue that the right of access should
incorporate the public's ability to hear the tapes and thus includes the right to
rebroadcast. See United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1254-55 (D.C. Cir.
1976); see also Myers, 635 F.2d at 952 ("[Tjhere is a presumption in favor of public inspection and copying of any item entered into evidence at a public session
of a trial.").
38. See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 824 (3d Cir. 1981)
("There can be no question that actual observation of testimony or exhibits contributes a dimension which cannot be fully provided by second-hand reports.").
39. See United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854, 859-60 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(trial court refused access to videotape evidence), rev'd, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir.
1981).
40. United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 824 (3d Cir. 1981). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not dispute the trial court's
finding that the rebroadcast of videotape evidence has a greater impact than the
written word. Id. at 823. However, according to the court, this impact serves to
enhance the public's understanding of judicial proceedings. Id. at 824. Thus,
the form of the evidence militates in favor of access. Id.; see also United States v.
Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1254-55 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("It is conceded that one who
listens to the tapes-the inflections, pauses, emphasis and the like-will be better able to understand the conversations than one who only reads the written
transcripts.").
41. See, e.g., Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598 ("It is uncontested...

that the right to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute."); Beckham,
789 F.2d at 409 ("[T]his right [to access] is not absolute and . . .a court may

exercise supervisory powers over the materials in its custody."); United States v.
Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("The right to access to judicial
records has never been considered absolute.").
Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598. The Warner Communica42. See, e.g.,

tions Court provided examples of situations in which access would be improper.
Id. According to the Court, the common-law right should not be "used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal." Id. (quoting In re Caswell, 18 R.I.
835, 836, 29 A. 259, 259 (1893) (disallowing publication of "the painful and
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Although the standard of review in cases involving a trial

judge's discretion is generally referred to as "abuse of discretion," the
scope of review will vary with the circumstances of the decision. 4 4 The
45
scope of review in decisions concerning accessibility is not settled.
However, most courts agree that it is not the narrow standard by which
decisions that rest primarily on the observations of the trial judge are
reviewed. 46 Thus, while a decision of a trial court based on the judge's
interaction with a party or witness may be reversed only if the decision
was arbitrary or capricious, a decision concerning access will be given
47
less deference.
sometimes disgusting details of a divorce case")). Nor should court files "serve
as reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption" or "sources of business information that might harm a litigant's competitive standing." Id.; see, e.g.,
Munzer v. Blaisdell, 268 App. Div. 9, 11, 48 N.Y.S.2d 355, 356 (1944) (plaintiff
may move to have papers sealed by court if they contain libelous words too
shocking to allow publicity); Flexmir, Inc. v. Herman, 40 A.2d 799, 800 (N.J. Ch.
1945) (ordering removal from court records of photographs entered into evidence in suit involving disclosure of trade secrets).
43. See Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598 (every court has supervisory
power over its own records and files); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814,
817-18 (3d Cir. 1981) (trial judge has discretion because of first-hand observation or direct contact with litigants and other pragmatic considerations).
44. See United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[T]he
scope of review will be directly related to the reason why that category or type of
decision is committed to the trial court's discretion in the first instance.").
45. For a brief discussion of the lack of a definitive standard as to access,
see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
46. See United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1981) (decision whether to release tapes not dependent in main on particular observations
of trial court, as other factors may control). The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Beckham expressly agreed with the Criden
court's analysis of the standard of review. 789 F.2d at 412-13. The Beckham
court stated:
On appeal, the Third Circuit first analyzed the different degrees of discretion exercised by a trial court, finding that a decision regarding the
common-law right to copy records should not be given the same deference as a decision on an award of attorneys' fees or a sentence within
statutory bounds. The court stated that the task of the appellate court
when reviewing a request to copy tapes is to determine whether the
relevant factors were considered and given appropriate weight. We
agree with this analysis. A mere articulation of rational justification will
not suffice in this context.
Id. (citations omitted); see also United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1294
(7th Cir. 1982) ("[I]t is vital for a court clearly to state the basis of its ruling, so
as to permit appellate review of whether relevant factors were considered and
given appropriate weight."); In re National Broadcasting Co. (Jenrette), 653 F.2d
609, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("This discretion [of the trial court], however, is not
open-ended.").
47. See United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817 (3d Cir. 1981). The
Criden court stated: "The justifications for committing decisions to the discretion of the court are not uniform, and may vary with the specific type of decisions." Id. For a further discussion and justification of the scope of review in
decisions concerning access, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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Constitutional Underpinnings

It is generally recognized and accepted that, once access is granted
to the media, the first amendment protects against restrictions on dissemination. 48 However, the role of the Constitution in the initial decision concerning access has not been conclusively defined. The question
presented is whether there is a constitutional right of physical access to
tapes admitted into evidence, grounded in either the first or sixth
amendments .49
48. The first amendment provides that: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press ...... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The first amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). The first amendment prohibits restrictions on the freedoms of speech and press by federal or state action.
See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (state statute may not permit enjoining publications merely because of content of articles without violating first amendment); see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 714 (1971) (dismissing a restraining order against publication of study on
United States' foreign policy in Vietnam because of violation of first amendment). For a full discussion of the Near and New York Times opinions, see J. NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, ch. 16, § 16.17, at 869-73
(3d ed. 1986). Such a prohibition extends to both prior restraints and subsequent punishment. Id. For a discussion of the distinction between these two
causes of action, see id. § 16.16, at 865-69. In the context of media publication
of evidence from a criminal trial, the first amendment prohibits restrictions on
the dissemination of such evidence after media access is granted. See, e.g., Smith
v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (state may not punish newspaper for publishing name of alleged juvenile delinquent without violating first
amendment); Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (state
cannot punish newspaper for publishing truthful information about confidential
investigation which is in progress without violating first amendment); Oklahoma
Publishing Co. v. District Ct., 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam) (state cannot
prohibit republication of information obtained in court proceedings without violating first amendment); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)
(court cannot issue restraining order prohibiting publication of confessions of
accused in murder trial without violating first amendment); Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (press cannot be restrained from printing
information lawfully obtained from open court hearing without violating first
amendment); see also Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States Dist. Ct., 729
F.2d 1174, 1183 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[U]nder our constitutional system prior restraints, if permissible at all, are permissible only in the most extraordinary of
circumstances."). For a discussion of these cases as well as other relevant opinions, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ch. 18,
§ VIII, at 910-23 (2d ed. 1983). See generally Monk, Media Access to Court Proceedings, 50 J.B.A. KAN. 212 (1981); O'Brien, Reassessing the First Amendment and the
Public's Right to Know in Constitutional Adjudication, 26 VILL. L. REV. 1, 32-48
(1980). For a further discussion of a first amendment-based right of access, see
infra notes 154-74 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 608 (broadcasters argued
that right to rebroadcast videotape evidence is guaranteed by both first and sixth
amendments). A right of access has been suggested based upon both the first
amendment's guarantee of free speech and the sixth amendment's guarantee of
a public trial. Id. The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar-
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In attempting to gain access to evidence at trials, the media have
argued that the sixth amendment requirement of a public trial includes a
requirement that all evidence, including videotape evidence, be made
available to the public through rebroadcast. 50 The Supreme Court in
Warner Communications, in response to such an argument, held that "[t]he
requirement of a public trial is satisfied by the opportunity of members

of the public and the press to attend the trial and to report what they
have observed." 5 1 Thus, according to the Court, once a trial has been
held open to both the public and the press, the sixth amendment requirement of a public trial is satisfied and there is no further require52
ment that the press be allowed physical access to recorded evidence.
The Supreme Court also dismissed the argument that the first
53
amendment guarantee of free speech and free press requires access.
The Warner Communications Court distinguished its decision in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,54 in which it held that the press cannot be prohibited from publishing the name of a rape victim when that information is
tialjury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment applies to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968).
For a further discussion of the support which the sixth amendment provides for
a right of access, see infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. For a further
discussion of the sixth amendment issue in the context of media access, see infra
notes 178-79 & 188-201 and accompanying text.
50. See Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 610. The media argued that,
although the Watergate trial was widely publicized, "public understanding of it
remain[ed] incomplete in the absence of the ability to listen to the tapes and
form judgments as to their meaning based on inflection and emphasis." Id.
Thus, according to the media, the sixth amendment requirement of a public trial
had not been satisfied. Id.
51. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 610. In reaching this decision, the
Court noted that the sixth amendment confers no special benefit on the press.
Id. (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 583 (1965) (Warren, J., concurring)).
The main purpose of the sixth amendment is, instead, to "safeguard against any
attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution." Id. (quoting In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)).
52. Id. The Court reasoned that the media's sixth amendment argument
requiring physical access to taped evidence could be extended to mandate the
live broadcast of a witness' testimony or the entire trial itself. Id. The Court
stated that no constitutional right to such broadcast has ever been recognized.
Id. Thus, according to the Court, no sixth amendment constitutional right to
physical access should be recognized. Id.
53. Id. at 608. The media argued that the Court's prior decision in Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), established a first amendment
right to rebroadcast the tapes. For a discussion of the facts of Cox, see infra note

54.
54. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). In Cox, the press learned the name of a rape victim and attempted to publish this information. Id. at 472-74. The victim's father
brought a suit for damages claiming invasion of privacy. Id. at 474. The trial
court granted summary judgment against the broadcasters. Id. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the publication was constitutionally protected. Id.
at 497.
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part of the public record. 55 In Cox, the issue was whether the press
could be denied access to records otherwise in the public domain. 5 6 In
contrast, the Court in Warner Communications addressed the issue of
whether the press has a right of physical access which the public itself
does not enjoy.5 7 The Court held that the "First Amendment generally
grants the press no right to information about a trial superior to that of
58
the general public."
In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia5 9 and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,60 the Supreme Court expanded the first amendment protections afforded the right of access. The Richmond Court held that the
right of the public and the press to attend criminal trials is constitutionally guaranteed. 6 1 Although there was no majority opinion in the case,
seven Justices agreed that the right of access to trials is grounded in the
55. Id. at 495.
56. Id. at 471. The Court framed the issue as "whether consistently with
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a State may extend a cause of action for
damages for invasion of privacy caused by the publication of the name of a deceased rape victim which was publicly revealed in connection with the prosecution of the crime." Id.
57. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 609. In so stating the issue, the
Court concluded that the holding in Cox Broadcastingwas not applicable to the
facts at hand. Id.
58. Id. The Court quoted its previous decisions in Estes v. Texas as support
for this proposition. Id. (citing 381 U.S. 532, 589 (1965)). In Estes, the pretrial
hearings of a Texan accused of swindling were broadcast live on television and
radio. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965). The microphones and broadcasting paraphernalia created "considerable disruption" in the courtroom. Id.
There was widespread publicity surrounding the hearing. Id. Both the witnesses
and the jury panel were aware of the publicity. Id. at 536-37. At the trial, live
broadcast of certain segments of the case was allowed. Id. at 537. At one point,
a television station rebroadcast the trial instead of the "late movie." Id. at 538.
The Supreme Court held that this activity violated the accused's constitutional
rights to due process. Id. at 534-35. Justice Harlan stated: "The line is drawn at
the courthouse door; and within, a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater
than those of any other member of the public." Id. at 589 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
59. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
60. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). In Globe Newspaper, the trial judge, upon preliminary motion, ordered that the courtroom be closed during the trial of a defendant accused of the rape of three minors. Id. at 598. Globe Newspaper Co. made
motions for access but was denied. Id. at 599. The trial judge based his denial
on a Massachusetts law that required judges to exclude the press from courtroom testimony of any victim under the age of 18 at trials for specified sexual
offenses. Id. at 598 n.l. The Supreme Court struck down this statute as violative of the first amendment right of "access" to criminal trials. Id. at 610-11.
61. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580-81. In Richmond Newspapers, the
trial court, upon motion by the defense counsel, ordered that a murder trial be
closed to the public. Id. at 560. The judge based his decision on a Virginia law
that gave judges discretion to close the courtroom whenever necessary. Id. at
560 n.2. The Supreme Court reversed the judge's ruling, holding that the right
of access is constitutionally guaranteed. Id.at 580.
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first amendment. 6 2 The Globe Newspaper Court reaffirmed Richmond,
holding that "the press and general public have a constitutional right of
63
access to criminal trials."
III.

THE CIRCUITS' ANALYSES

A.

The Myers Approach

In In re National BroadcastingCo. (Myers), 64 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit established its approach to the issue of
media access to videotape evidence in criminal prosecutions. The case
was one of the "Abscam" 65 cases which involved the prosecution of several members of Congress and other public officials for bribery and related charges. 6 6 The tapes at issue were recordings of some of the
dealings between undercover Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
agents and the defendants. 6 7 The trial court allowed the press into the
courtroom and gave transcripts of the recorded evidence to members of
the media. 68 The trial judge granted the application of three major television networks to copy and televise the tapes. 69 The Second Circuit
62. Id. at 558-81 (plurality opinion); id. at 584-98 (Brennan,J., concurring);
id. at 598-601 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 601-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this case. Id. at 581. However, in
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, he expressed his opinion that the right of access to
criminal trials is protected by the first amendment. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368, 397-98 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (" Because of the importance of the public's having accurate information concerning the operation of its
criminal justice system, I would hold explicitly that petitioner's reporter had an
interest protected by the first and fourteenth amendments.").
63. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 603 (citing Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)).
64. 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980). For an analysis of Myers and the controversy surrounding the right of access, see Note, Common Law Right of Access to
Judicial Records-CriminalDefendant's Right to a Fair Trial, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 843,
843-51.
65. Myers, 635 F.2d at 947. "Abscam" refers to a "sting" operation conducted by the FBI in order to uncover corruption in government activity. Id.
Agents of the FBI used the ficticious name of Abdul Enterprises Ltd. as a cover.
Id. The agents posed as businessmen for this ficticious Middle Eastern business
and offered bribes to various public officials in order to secure their help with
certain immigration problems. Id. The term "Abscam" was coined from the
first two letters of Abdul Enterprises and the word "scam." Id.
66. Id. The four appellants in Myers were Congressman Michael 0. Myers,
Angelo J. Errichetti (Mayor of Camden), Louis C. Johnson (member of Philadelphia City Council) and Howard L. Criden (Philadelphia attorney). Id. at 948.
67. Id.Agents for the FBI surreptitiously recorded their conversations with
these public officials. Id. at 947. In the Myers case, the most significant tape at
issue was one containing Congressman Myers' acceptance of $50,000 and his
demand for an additional $35,000. Id.
68. Id. at 948. In addition to the transcripts, sketch artists from the media
were allowed to sketch scenes from the tapes as they were played to thejury. Id.
Portions of these sketches were published by the media throughout the trial. Id.
69. Id. at 948-49. The trial judge stated that "the tapes themselves are evi-
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affirmed this decision. 70 The Myers court expressed its approval of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's handling
of this issue in United States v. Mitchell.7 t The court in Myers noted that
although Mitchell was reversed on statutory grounds, it remains "strong
authority" for the common-law right to copy and telecast tapes admitted
into evidence. 72 The Myers court recognized the presumption in favor
of access and stated that "it would take the most extraordinary circumstances to justify restrictions on the opportunity of those not physically
in attendance at the courtroom to see and hear the evidence, when it is
in a form that readily permits sight and sound reproduction" and that
"only the most compelling circumstances should prevent contempora73
neous public access to [the tapes]."
According to the Myers court, the involvement of public officials in a
criminal case adds to the strength of the presumption in favor of access.74 The court dismissed the argument that the risk to the fair-trial
rights of the defendants on trial and those awaiting trial mandate denial
of access. 75 The court relied most heavily on the availability of cautionary instructions and voir dire examination 76 to eliminate any prejudice
77
created by pretrial publicity.
dence [and] they are, under common law principles, available to the public and
the press." Id. at 949.
70. Id. at 954.
71. Id. at 952. For a discussion of Mitchell, see supra note 4.
72. 635 F.2d at 951. The Myers court qualified this statement by noting that
Mitchell remains strong authority, at least in relation to those tapes containing
evidence of activities of defendants not facing a likelihood of subsequent trials.
Id. This qualification relates to the risk of infringement of a defendant's fair-trial
rights due to widespread prejudicial publicity. For a discussion of the Myers
court's analysis of a defendant's fair-trial rights in the context of media access,
see infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
73. 635 F.2d at 952. The court noted that the opportunity for copying
need not necessarily occur simultaneously with the presentation of the evidence
to the jury. Id. n.7. It deemed the trial judge's procedure for an opportunity to

copy the tapes at the end of court sessions to be an appropriate accommodation
of the right of public access to judicial records with the orderly conduct of the
trial. Id.
74. Id. at 952. The court noted that, although the transcripts have already
provided an opportunity to know, there is a "legitimate and important interest"
in allowing the public to see evidence concerning members of Congress and
local officials. Id.
75. Id. at 953. The court acknowledged that televising the tapes does in-

crease the number of people aware of the contents of the evidence. Id. However, the court did not translate this into a prejudicial impact on the defendants'
sixth amendment rights. Id. The court stated that the use of curative devices,
especially voir dire examination, can quell the impact of the increased publicity.

Id.
76. Id. For further discussion of the use of these curative devices, see infra
notes 180-213 and accompanying text.
77. 635 F.2d at 953. In so concluding, the court stated that it did not believe that the public at large had to be sanitized "as if they would become jurors
in the remaining Abscam trials." Id. at 953-54. "The alleged risk to a fair trial
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Circuits' Reactions to Myers

Courts Recognizing a Strong Presumption

In United States v. Criden,78 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit addressed the issue of media access to tape-recorded
evidence in criminal trials. 79 The case involved the trial of two members
of the Philadelphia City Council based on their alleged Abscam involvement. 80 The trial court denied the media the opportunity to copy and
broadcast the taped evidence. 8 ' This decision was based primarily on
82
the fact that the trials of two other Abscam defendants were pending.
According to the trial judge, the pendency of these trials mandated denial of access because of the potential prejudicial impact which access
would have on those two defendants' sixth amendment rights.83 The
Third Circuit reversed, 8 4 holding that there exists a strong presumption
85
in favor of access.
for the Abscam defendants yet to be tried is too speculative," according to the
court, "to justify denial of the public's right to inspect and copy evidence
presented in open court." Id. at 954.
78. 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981).
79. Id.at 815.

80. Id.The defendants in this case were George Schwartz, a former president of the Philadelphia City Council, and Harry P. Jannotti, a former member
of the Council. Id. Their trial was severed from those of two co-defendants,
Louis C. Johanson, another Council member, and Howard L. Criden, a Philadelphia attorney. Id. The Criden case represents the second case in a long string of
Abscam prosecutions, beginning with the Myers case. Id. For a further discussion of Myers, see supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
81. 648 F.2d at 816.
82. Id. Among the reasons given by the trial court to justify its denial were
the pendency of a similar appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in an Abscam case in which the district court had ordered
that the tapes be released to the press, the pendency of the Johanson-Criden
trial, the outstanding indictments and possibility of a retrial of defendants
Schwartz and Janotti and the existence of substantial due process challenges to
the indictments. Id.
83. Id. The trial of two co-defendants, Johanson, a member of the City
Council, and Criden, a Philadelphia attorney, had been severed. Id.at 815. The
trial judge stated that the pendency of their trial mandated denial of access because of the possible prejudicial impact of access on their sixth amendment
rights. Id. at 816. The trial judge also expressed concern over the possibility of
prejudicial impact on Schwartz and Jannotti, the two co-defendants whose trial
had been completed. Id. at 826. This concern stemmed from the possibility of a
retrial and the difficulty in obtaining an impartial jury should such a trial occur.
Id.
84. Id.at 815. The Criden case was argued before Chief Judge Seitz and
Circuit Judges Weis and Sloviter. Id. Judge Sloviter wrote the majority opinion.
Id.
85. Id. at 823. The Third Circuit held "that there is a strong presumption
that material introduced into evidence at trial should be made reasonably accessible in a manner suitable for copying and broader dissemination." Id. The
court stated that the strength of the presumption must be weighed in terms of
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The Criden opinion was based in large part on the Third Circuit's
perception of the importance of "openness" in criminal trials. 86 According to the court, there is a legitimate public interest in knowing and
understanding what transpires in the courtroom-an interest which is
enhanced when a public official is involved. 8 7 However, as the Third
any factors present justifying denial of the application for access. Id. The Criden
court acknowledged that the most significant factor weighing against access is
the risk ofjeopardizing the fair-trial rights of the defendants in the case before it
as well as those defendants awaiting trial. Id. at 826. If rebroadcast of the videotape evidence would render an impartial verdict an impossibility in either the
present trial or any future trial, then denial of access is justified. Id. However,
the Criden court went on to establish that prejudice of this sort could not be
shown in the present case. Id. at 827.
Chief Judge Seitz and Judge Sloviter both joined in the Third Circuit's reversal of the trial court's decision to deny access. Id. at 815. Judge Weis wrote a
concurring and dissenting opinion. Id. at 830 (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting). Although the majority recognized a strong presumption in favor of access,
it did not consider whether this presumption is protected by the first amendment. Id. at 820. However, the majority did state that "some of the same policy
considerations identified as supporting open trials may be considered when the
issue involves the common law right of access to trial materials." Id. at 820. The
majority went on to discuss at length the Richmond Newspapers Court's analysis of
the policy considerations underlying the first amendment right to attend trials.
Id. at 819-23 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)). It was this part
of the majority opinion that prompted Judge Weis' dissent. Id. at 830 (Weis, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Judge Weis stated that "[tihe extended discussion
of Richmond Newspapers....
in the majority opinion, albeit accompanied by disclaimers, has an unfortunate tendency to conjure up constitutional confusion
about the right of access at issue here." Id. at 830 (Weis, J., concurring and
dissenting) (citation omitted). Judge Weis reiterated the opinion that "the right
to copy court exhibits is not of constitutional derivation but springs from a common law tradition." Id. Judge Weis further argued that because the majority
labelled the presumption as "strong," it afforded it protections similar to those
afforded constitutional rights. Id. at 831 (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting).
For this reason, Judge Weis stated that no label should be given the presumption. Id. It should instead, he argued, be one factor in considering the question
of access. Id. In spite of Judge Weis' disagreement with the language of the
majority, he did concur in the result. Id. at 833 (Weis, J., concurring and
dissenting).
86. 648 F.2d at 820-21. The court stated: "To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process 'satisfy the appearance ofjustice,' . . . and the
appearance ofjustice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it." Id.
at 821 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
87. Id. at 822. According to the court, the fact that the performances of
public officials are involved contributes to the creation of a "legitimate public
interest in the proceedings far beyond the usual criminal case." Id. The first
amendment rights of free speech and free press have been recognized as a check
on government and government officials. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at
575 ("These expressly guaranteed freedoms share a common core purpose of
assurring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government."). The common-law right of access plays this same role by allowing citizens to view the judicial process. Id. at 569. This viewing serves as a
public check on the government and its officials. Id. The Richmond court quoted
Jeremy Bentham to stress the role of access as a public tool to oversee the fairness of government:
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Circuit noted, practical limitations of the courtroom render it impossible
for the public as a whole to observe the proceedings. 88 Thus, according
to the court, the right to broadcast the evidence is a necessary extension
of the right to observe. 89 The Criden court rejected the argument that
rebroadcast would impose "enhanced punishment." 90 According to the
court, publicity, which is further enhanced by the involvement of public
officials, is an unavoidable aspect of criminal trials. 9 ' The court also
rejected the related argument that rebroadcast would infringe upon the
defendants' rights to a fair trial. 9 2 Although the court conceded that
this was the most serious consideration because the defendants' sixth
amendment rights were at issue, the court stressed the use of voir dire as
a curative device. 9 3 The court saw no reason to deny the application
based on "hypothetical prejudice" to the defendants whose trials were
94
pending.
Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of
publicity, all other checks are of small account. Recordation, appeal,
whatever other institutions might present themselves in the character
of checks, would be found to operate rather as cloaks than checks; as
cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance.
Id. (quoting 1J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827)).
88. Id. The right to attend criminal trials secured by the Supreme Court in
Richmond Newspapers is subject to realistic limitations. Id. Only those who have
the time and means to attend can benefit from this right. Id.
89. Id. The court stated that in order to secure the values stressed by the
Richmond Newspapers Court, the tapes must be rebroadcast. Id.
90. Id. at 824-25. In denying access, the district court had placed great emphasis on the effect which rebroadcast would have on the fair-trial rights of the
defendants in the completed trial in light of retrial possibilities and on the defendants awaiting trial on similar charges. Id. at 824.
91. Id. The Third Circuit distinguished the facts before it from situations in
which rebroadcast would inflict additional pain on the victim in a criminal case
or on other innocent third parties. Id. at 825. The court used the example of

videotape evidence showing conversation and conduct prior to the commission
of a rape. Id.; see In re Application of KSTP Television, 504 F. Supp. 360 (D.
Minn. 1980) (denying application to copy videotape of conduct preliminary to
and in anticipation of rape of kidnapping victim). The Criden court noted that
"when the defendants themselves were public figures and their conduct was already the subject of national publicity and comment, we find the district court's
concerns about the incremental effect of rebroadcast publicity to be unconvincing." Criden, 648 F.2d at 825. The Criden court concluded that, without any evidence to the contrary, such rebroadcast could not appropriately be considered

enhanced punishment of defendants. Id. The court also stressed that there was
no suggestion that the broadcasters were motivated by any improper purpose.
Id. at 826.
92. Id. at 826-28.
93. Id. at 827-28. The Criden court interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Chandler v. Florida as standing for the proposition that, when there is a
possibility of prejudicial impact due to publicity, the court should rely primarily
on the availability of voir dire examination. Id. (citing Chandler v. Florida, 449
U.S. 560, 574-75 (1981)).

94. 648 F.2d at 827. The court noted that because there is a certain
amount of publicity expected in any criminal proceeding, "we must distinguish
between those situations where there is hypothetical prejudice and those where
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In In re National Broadcasting Co. (Jenrette),9 5 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia followed the Myers approach in
recognizing a strong presumption in favor of access. 9 6 This case was
another in the string of Abscam prosecutions. 9 7 The D.C. Circuit revsersed the trial court's decision to deny access, 98 relying most heavily on
its previous decision in Mitchell which had delineated the contours of the
common-law right. 9 9 According to the court, "access may be denied
only if the district court . . . concludes that 'justice so requires.' "100
The Jenrette court discussed several factors which weigh in favor of access. 10 The most significant were: the involvement of public officials in
the case, the availability of curative devices and the "hypothetical" na02
ture of the prejudicial impact on the defendants.'
it can be demonstrated that there has been actual prejudice caused by publicity."
Id. Compare Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981) with Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532 (1965). In terms of the defendants already before the court and the
possibility of a retrial, the Criden court stressed the fact that the trial judge had
no previous difficulty selecting a jury notwithstanding the widespread publicity
surrounding the Abscam scandal. Criden, 648 F.2d at 827. At the trial level, the
judge stated that "while virtually all of the prospective jurors called in the
Schwartz and Jannotti case had heard or read about the case, most were able to
state, truthfully in my view ....that they had formed no lasting conclusions." Id.
(quoting United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854, 861 (E.D. Pa. 1980)). The
Third Circuit relied on this language to point out that publicity does not necessarily lead to an infringement of a defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury. Id. The court stated that "the appropriate course to
follow when the spectre of prejudicial publicity is raised is not automatically to
deny access but to rely primarily on the curative device of voir dire examination." Id. For a further discussion of sixth amendment implications, see infra
notes 178-79 & 188-201 and accompanying text.
95. 653 F.2d 609 (1981).
96. Id. at 613.
97. Id. at 611. The case involved the prosecution ofJohn Jenrette, a congressman from the Sixth District of South Carolina, and John Stowe, a private
citizen. Id. Both were accused of accepting bribes in return for governmental
favors. Id. Video and audiotape evidence of conversations between FBI agents
and the defendants constituted a principal portion of the government's case. Id.
Several broadcasters applied for post-trial permission to copy and rebroadcast
these tapes. Id. at 610. These requests were denied by the trial court. Id.
98. Id. The trial court allowed the press and public to listen to the tapes as
they were played for the jury. Id. at 611. In addition, transcripts of the audiotapes were given to the media. Id. However, transcripts of the videotapes were
not distributed, and the trial court denied an application to copy and broadcast
the evidence. Id. at 611-12.
99. See id. at 613-21 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C.
Cir. 1976)). For a discussion of Mitchell, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
100. 653 F.2d at 613 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252,
1260 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
101. Id. at 613-18.
102. Id. at 614-19. TheJenrette court listed five factors that favored release
of the disputed tapes: 1) the tapes were admitted into evidence and played to
the jury; 2) the tapes had been seen and heard by those members of the press
and public who attended the trial; 3) the tapes contained only admissible evidence, were introduced for the purpose of proving the guilt of the defendants
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also
discussed some of these factors in United States v. Edwards. 10 3 Although
the outcome in Edwards differs from the outcome in the cases previously
discussed,10 4 the discussion of the right of access and the analysis of the
relevant factors is similar. 10 5 The case involved the trial of an Indiana
state senator and an Indiana businessman who were charged with accepting unlawful payments in exchange for influencing legislation. 10 6
During the trial, the court admitted an audio recording of a telephone
call into evidence. 10 7 The recording was played for the jury and transcripts were published in local newspapers.' 0 8 Certrain broadcasting
stations requested permission to broadcast the tapes.' 0 9 The trial court
denied this request.110
and were obviously relied upon by the jury in finding the defendants guilty;
4) the nature of the trial itself, which involved an issue of major public importance and 5) the tapes sought were fully within the presumption in favor of access. Id. at 614.
103. 672 F.2d 1289, 1291-96 (7th Cir. 1982). For additional analyses of
this case, see Comment, The Right of Access to Judicial Records: When May the Electronic Media Copy Audio and Videotape Evidence?, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 755, 755-73

(1984) (concluding that access should be denied only when threat to sixth
amendment rights is actual); Note, Media Access to Evidentiary Materials: United
States v. Edwards, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1455, 1455-72 (concluding that public's
right to access will be afforded substantial deference in future Seventh Circuit
cases).
104. Unlike the previous cases, Edwards involved an appeals court's affirmation of the trial court's denial of access to taped evidence. 672 F.2d at 1290.
105. See 672 F.2d at 1290.
106. Id. at 1290. The defendants in this case were Martin K. Edwards, a
state senator and president pro tempore of the Indiana Senate, and Francis B.

Kendall, a private businessman. Id.
107. Id. at 1290-91. The recording was a conversation between Edwards
and John L. Cline, who was initially indicted along with the other defendants,
but against whom charges were subsequently dropped. Id. at 1290-91 & n.2.
108. Id. at 1291. It was not clear in the records how the broadcasters received transcripts of the evidence. Id. However, a day before the tapes were
played in court, the transcripts did appear in The IndianapolisNews and The Indianapolis Star. Id.

109. Id. The requests were made both informally and by written application. Id. The court heard oral argument on the requests. Id.
110. Id. The trial court's denial was based on three factors. Id. First, the
court expressed concern that access to the tapes might be interpreted as placing
a judicial imprimatur on the evidence which might be rebutted by subsequent

testimony. Id. Second, one of the defendants, Edwards, had a trial pending on
charges of tax evasion and the trial court concluded that finding an impartial
jury for this future trial could prove difficult. Id. Finally, according to the trial
court, the resolution of the Judicial Conference of the United States banning the
live broadcast of trials was a relevant consideration. Id.; see CODE or JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3A(7) (as amended 1982) (for United States Judges). This Judicial Conference resolution was based on the fear that the live broadcast of
trials would have an impact on the conduct of the trial itself. See Criden, 648 F.2d
at 829. The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
live broadcast of trials in Chandler v. Florida. 449 U.S. 560, 582-83 (1981). Thus,
the concerns underlying the Judicial Conference were alleviated on a constitu-
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The Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision. " ' In doing
so, however, the court did recognize a strong presumption in favor of
access. 1 l 2 The court did not go so far as to require compelling circumstances in order to deny access,"13 but it did state that access can be
denied only when a detrimental effect on a defendant's sixth amendment fair trial right is proved through "articulable facts." ' 1 4 The Edwar& court suggested that, in terms of the case before it, jury
instructions might have served to eliminate any prejudice." 5 The court
tional level. Criden, 648 F.2d at 829. However, a trial judge may still consider
the impact of the live broadcast of evidence as a factor in deciding the question

of access. Id. The Judicial Conference, in and of itself, however, is not a relevant consideration because it is based on concerns different from those underlying a decision concerning physical access to tape-recorded evidence. Id. The

Criden court stated:
The Judicial Conference resolution is based on apprehension about the
effect that contemporaneous broadcast of trial proceedings might have
on the conduct of the trial itself. This cannot be a relevant factor when
the material sought for copying is merely . . .[a tape recording] of a
preexisting event, since the participants on the tape cannot posture or
otherwise change their behavior to play before a television audience.
Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the
Third Circuit's analysis of the Judicial Conference resolution. See Edwards, 672
F.2d at 1295.
111. 672 F.2d at 1290.
112. Id. The court stated: "For guidance in future cases, however, we make
clear that there is a strong presumption in favor of the common law right of
access to judicial records and that permission to inspect, copy, and disseminate
should be denied only where actual, as opposed to hypothetical, factors demonstrate that justice so requires." Id. Although the Edwards court spoke of a strong
presumption in favor of access, access was denied. The most compelling reason
for this denial was the infringement on the defendant's sixth amendment right
to a fair trial. Martin Edwards faced an already scheduled future trial for tax
evasion, In this case, there was more than a mere possibility of a future trial.
Thus, despite the Seventh Circuit's strong articulation in favor of access, the
trial court's denial of access was affirmed. However, in a more recent Seventh
Circuit case the language in Edwards was used to allow access to videotape evidence in a factual setting involving a more hypothetical possibility of prejudice
to the defendant's constitutional rights. See United States v. Guzzino, 766 F.2d
302, 304 (7th Cir. 1985). For a further discussion of Guzzino, see infra notes 11922 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 103, at 1472 ("Access was
denied [in Edwards] ... but the unique factual and legal context of the district
court case .... indicates that the public's right to know will be given substantial
weight by the Seventh Circuit in the future.").
113. 672 F.2d at 1294. The court stated that it was "unwilling to go so far
as the Second Circuit's statement that only exceptional circumstances will justify
non-access." Id. The Edwards court was referring to the Myers opinion, which
stated that "it would take the most extraordinary circumstances to justify restrictions [on the right of access]." See Myers, 635 F.2d at 952.
114. 672 F.2d at 1294. In so concluding, the Edwards court distingushed
between "articulable facts known to the court" and "unsupported hypothesis or
conjecture." Id. Further, the court stressed the importance of a trial court's
stating the basis of its ruling "so as to permit appellate review of whether relevant factors were considered and given appropriate weight." Id.
115. Id. at 1295-96. The court noted that the danger of a jury misinter-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1987

21

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

204

[Vol. 32: p. 183

also noted that the use of voir dire may be a sufficient curative device to
prevent prejudice at future trials."t 6 The trial judge himself acknowledged that this would most likely overcome the problem."t 7 However,
the Seventh Circuit held that the judge did not abuse his discretion in
denying access. 1 18
In United States v. Guzzino," 9 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit once again confronted the issue of access by the media to audio or video tapes that have been admitted into evidence in a
criminal trial. 120 The Guzzino court noted the strong presumption in
favor of access previously acknowledged in Edwards and allowed the media access to tapes that had been admitted into evidence.' 2 ' In a short
opinion, the Seventh Circuit stated that, absent definitive evidence of an
infringement of defendant's constitutional rights, access must be
allowed.'

2.

22

Courts Rejecting the Myers Approach

Three circuit courts of appeal have explicitly rejected the Second
Circuit's approach in Myers and have refused to recognize a strong presumption in favor of access. 123 The first court to articulate this view was
preting the significance of a grant of access may normally be mitigated "by
firmly instructing the jury that the court expresses no opinion on the merits of
particular testimony or exhibits and by cautioning them to avoid news reports of
the trial." Id. at 1296.
116. Id. In noting this potential curative device, the Edwards court observed
that, generally, those courts that find the presumption of access to be strong
tend to discount the risk of harm to the proceedings. Id. Conversely, courts
which minimize the importance of the presumption accentuate potential jeopardy to other cases. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. According to the court, the "acknowledgement [sic] ... that the
difficulty could be overcome makes the case closer, but does not .

.

. demon-

strate an abuse of discretion." Id. For a further discussion of the reasons for the
Seventh Circuit's denial of access, see supra note 112.
119. 766 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1985).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 304. Guzzino involved the criminal trial of defendants Richard
Guzzino and Robert Ciarrocchi. Id. at 303. At the criminal trial of the two defendants, the government introduced into evidence and played to the jury two
audio tapes of telephone conversations between Guzzino and a government witness. Id. CBS, Inc. (CBS) requested access to the tapes so that they could be
copied. Id. The district court denied CBS's motion, but allowed access to a
transcript of the tapes. Id. The district judge based his decision on the poor
quality of the tapes and his concern that release of the tapes could result in a
misunderstanding of what was actually said on the tapes. Id.
122. Id. at 304. In reaching its conclusion in favor of access, the Guzzino
court held that it was improper for the trial judge to consider the factor of potential inaccurate reporting. Id. The court stated that the trial judge's sole concern should have been with the constitutional rights of the defendants before it.
Id.
123. See Beckham, 789 F.2d 401; United States v. Webbe, 791 F.2d 103 (8th

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol32/iss1/5

22

Starczewski: Media Access to Tape-Recorded Evidence in Criminal Trials

1987]

NOTE

205

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark.' 2 4 Belo involved the prosecution of several public officials based on FBI findings during the "Brilab"' 2 5 investigation. The
trial court denied the media access to the audiotape evidence. 126 The
Fifth Circuit affirmed this decision. 127 The Belo court's opinion was
based primarily on the conclusion that the right of access is not of constitutional proportion.1 28 After so concluding, the court stated that the
balance to be drawn in deciding a request for media access is one between the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial and the noncon129
stitutional right of access asserted by the media.
It was on this premise that the court based its explicit rejection of
the Myers approach.' 30 According to the Belo court, the strength of the
presumption in favor of access recognized in Myers is not appropriate
when a mere common-law right is being asserted. 13 1 The court acknowledged a presumption in favor of access but stated that it is
subordinate to any prejudicial impact on the sixth amendment rights of
the defendant involved.' 32 In terms of whether the prejudice is too
Cir. 1986); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981). For
a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 124-51 and accompanying text.
124. 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981).
125. Id. at 425. "Brilab" refers to an FBI "sting" operation that exposed
alleged bribery in the awarding of state employee insurance contracts. Id. The
Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives and two Texas attorneys were
tried and acquitted. Id. However, at the time of the request for access, the trial
of a fourth party, a labor official, was still pending. Id.
126. Id. The trial court's decision was based primarily on concern for the
sixth amendment rights of the defendant whose trial was pending. Id. The
judge held that rebroadcast would severely infringe on the selection of an impartial jury. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 426-29. The Belo court stressed the Supreme Court's holding in
Warner Communications that there is no first amendment right of physical access to
courtroom exhibits. Id. at 428. The court interpreted Richmond Newspapers as
supporting that decision. Id. According to the Belo court, Richmond Newspapers
established only a constitutional right to attend certain criminal trials, rather
than a constitutional right of access to trial evidence. Id. at 427-28. The Belo
court argued that the Richmond Newspapers holding was a narrow one and did not
disturb or derogate from the Warner Communications decision. Id. at 428.
129. Id. at 432. The Belo court stated: "The district court was not at all
required to balance fair trial with free press concerns. The choice was rather
between an undeniably important but nonconstitutional right of physical access
...and a defendant's due process right to a fair trial .
Id.
130. Id. at 433-34.
131. Id. The Belo court stated that "[in erecting such stout barriers against
those opposing access and in limiting the exercise of the trial court's discretion,
our fellow circuits have created standards more appropriate for protection of
constitutional than of common law rights." Id. at 434.
132. Id. at 432. The court referred to the right of access as "undeniably

important but nonconstitutional" while the sixth amendment right to a fair trial
was labelled "the linchpin of our criminal justice system." Id. (quoting Criden,
648 F.2d at 827).
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speculative to warrant protection, the Belo court agreed that the purported prejudice to a defendant's sixth amendment rights must be more
than merely hypothetical; the court, however, stated that the trial
judge's opinion as to possible harm is sufficient. ' 3 3 The court refused to
question the trial judge's evaluation of the availability of voir dire and
other curative devices.' 3 4 Thus, according to the Fifth Circuit, the trial
judge's prediction of problems in selecting an impartial jury serves as an
35
adequate basis for denying access.1
Similarly, in United States v. Beckham,' 3 6 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided the issue of media access and articulated a rationale similar to that presented by the Fifth Circuit in
Belo.' 3 7 The trial court denied access to tapes that were admitted into
38
evidence at the trial of a Detroit public official and other defendants.'
The Sixth Circuit affirmed this decision.' 3 9 The Beckham court held that
not only is there no first amendment right of access, but, further, that
the policy considerations behind the first amendment right to attend trials established by the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers 14 and the
133. Id. at 431. In the words of the court: "Speculative dismissal by an
appellate court of a trial judge's admittedly uncertain but quite reasonable prognostication only compounds the problem. The informed and considered judgment of the trial judge should prevail in any choice between such equally
speculative results." Id.
134. Id. at 432. The court stated that questioning the trial judge's opinion
as to this would "require us to direct the trial judge in the practical management
and operation of his courtroom, a course we are loath to take in any but the most
extreme circumstances. We cannot assume trial court ignorance of those familiar devices, and we will not assume inattention to their availability." Id.
135. Id.
136. 789 F.2d 401 (6th Cir. 1986). Beckham involved the prosecution of
several defendants, one of whom was a Detroit city official. Id. at 403. The defendants were accused of defrauding the city. Id. The government presented
several audio and video tapes at trial. Id. These tapes were broadcast over a
loudspeaker and transcripts were given to the jurors. Id. However, the court
denied media access to both the transcripts and the tapes. Id. at 404-05.
137. Id. at 403-15. For a discussion of the standard of access articulated by
the Fifth Circuit in Belo, see infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
138. 789 F.2d at 403. The media in Beckham originally sought to obtain
copies of tapes and other exhibits. Id. at 404. They subsequently filed an application for contemporaneous access to all tapes, transcripts and documentary exhibits admitted into evidence or used at trial. Id. The court defined
contemporaneous access as "access at the time the evidence is presented in
court or at the end of the day in which the evidence is introduced." Id. The
requests were denied. Id. Several subsequent attempts by the media to gain
access, including a petition for a writ of mandamus, also failed. Id.
139. Id. at 415. Although it noted that the trial judge's decision may have
been overly cautious, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the primary responsibility for the "orderly administration of a criminal trial" rested on his shoulders.
Id. Given the media's access to the courtroom, the court of appeals refused to
say that the district court abused its discretion. Id.
140. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569-73. For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's decision in Richmond Newspapers, see supra notes 159-62 and
accompanying text.
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common-law right of access are not similar. 14 1 The court agreed with
other courts of appeals that the involvement of public officials militates
in favor of access. 1 4 2 However, the Beckham court did not accept the
Myers standard that only the most extraordinary circumstances justify
denial of access. 14 3 According to the Sixth Circuit, access must be denied whenever a defendant's sixth amendment rights may be infringed
by a grant of access to the media.' 4 4 The court accepted the trial
of sixth amendment infringejudge's findings concerning the 4likelihood
5
ments and thus denied access.'
In United States v. Webbe,' 4 6 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit reached a conclusion analogous to that of the Sixth
Circuit in Beckham.1 4 7 The Eighth Circuit specifically refused to recognize a strong presumption in favor of access. 14 8 As in previous cases
141. 789 F.2d at 413. The Sixth Circuit agreed withJudge Weis' concurring and dissenting opinion in Criden. Id. (citing Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 830-33
(3d Cir. 1981) (Weis,J., concurring and dissenting)). Weis argued that the legal
underpinnings of the rights in question are dissimilar. See Ciden, 648 F.2d 814,
830-33 (3d Cir. 1981) (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting). For a discussion of
Weis' opinion, see supra note 85.
142. 789 F.2d at 413. For a discussion of other decisions that emphasize
the importance of a public official in this context, see supra notes 74, 87 & 102.
143. 789 F.2d at 414. The court stated: "We agree with the Second Circuit
that the common-law right extends to tape-recordings, but respectfully disagree
that only the most extraordinary reasons justify a restriction on the common-law
right .... " Id. For a further discussion of the Beckham court's analysis of Myers,
see infra note 144. For a further discussion of Myers, see supra notes 64-77 and
accompanying text.
144. 789 F.2d at 415. In so concluding, the court distinguished the aforementioned "Abscam" cases (e.g., Myers) by finding that the danger to the de-

fendants' right to a fair trial in the case before it was more grave than in those
previous cases. Id. The court stated that "there was more than city government
and possible political corruption involved in this case; there were extremely sen-

sitive issues of racial prejudice in Detroit." Id. According to the court, the sensitive nature of the case "increased the likelihood of an infringement of the
defendants' sixth amendment right to a fair trial." Id. For a further discussion
of the sixth amendment in the context of media access, see infra notes 188-201
and accompanying text.
145. 789 F.2d at 415. The trial judge found that the available curative devices were insufficient. Id. According to the judge, jurors willing to be sequestered are few. Id. In addition, the rebroadcast would affect a high percentage of

potential jurors, creating difficulty in impanelling an impartial jury. Id. The
judge also indicated concern over the "furor in the community" caused by racial
disputes which could affect the "orderly, fair administration of criminal justice."
Id.
146. 791 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1986). Webbe involved a prosecution based on
voting fraud and obstruction of justice. Id. at 104. Webbe, the defendant, a

public figure, had served as alderman for the seventh ward in St. Louis and had
also served on the Democratic Party Committee. Id. The trial court admitted
several audiotapes into evidence. Id. The media was furnished with transcripts
of tapes. Id. CBS applied for access to rebroadcast the tapes and was denied.
Id.

147. See id. at 106-07.
148. Id. at 106.
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denying access, 14 9 a great deal of deference was given to the trial
judge's articulation of the factors weighing against access.15 0 The court
held that, since the defendant in this case had other charges pending
and the trial judge had had difficulty in the previous case selecting a
jury, prejudice at the defendant's subsequent trial was not merely hypothetical and, thus, the trial court had discretion to deny access151
IV.

ANALYSIS

As the case law analyzed in this Note suggests, there is currently a
conflict among the courts of appeals as to whether the courts should
recognize a presumption in favor of media access to tape-recorded evidence admitted at criminal trials and which factors should be determinative in a decision concerning media access to such evidence. 15 2 The two
most significant aspects of the courts' opinions are the constitutional
analyses upon which such decisions have been based and the examinations by the courts of the availability of curative devices to preserve de53
fendants' fair-trial rights when access has been granted.'
A.

A ConstitutionalPerspective

Although the Supreme Court refused to recognize a first amendment right of access in Warner Communications,154 the existence of such a
right remains plausible following the Court's decisions in Richmond
Newspapers and Globe Newspaper.155 In Warner Communications, the Court
149. For a discussion of cases rejecting a strong presumption in favor of
access, see supra notes 124-45 and accompanying text.
150. 791 F.2d at 106-07. The Webbe court stated that "the decision as to
access is properly handled on an ad hoc basis by the district judge, who is in the
best position to recognize and weigh the appropriate factors . . . We are ill-

equipped to second-guess his determination." Id. at 107.
151. Id. at 107. In discussing the trial court's opinion, the Eighth Circuit
stated: "The court noted that not only was the vote fraud case currently underway, but Webbe had two other charges pending against him in the district in
which the tapes admitted in the vote fraud trial might also be used." Id. at 106.
The court also noted that the trial judge had experienced difficulty in selecting a
jury. Id.
152. For a discussion of the current conflict among the circuits in this regard, see supra notes 64-151 and accompanying text.
153. For an analysis of the constitutional perspective in media access cases,
see infra notes 154-74 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the use of
curative devices in the same cases, see infra notes 180-213 and accompanying
text.
154. 435 U.S. 589, 608-09 (1978). For an analysis of this opinion, see supra
notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
155. See Note, supra note 103, at 1469-71 (noting that Globe Newspaper
strengthens argument that right of access to judicial records is grounded in first
amendment); Note, supra note 6, at 452 n.44 ("There is a speculative possibility,
noted in Criden....

that Richmond Newspapers heralds a more expansive view of

the First Amendment's application to court records than was followed in Warner
Communications."). For further discussion of the Richmond Newspapers and Globe
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rejected the existence of a constitutional right of access for the media. 156 The Court reasoned that the media possess no right superior to
that of the general public and, therefore, that media access is limited to
attendance at trials. 157 At the time of the Warner Communications decision, the Court had recognized only a presumption of openness in criminal trials. 15 However, in Richmond Newspapers, the Court raised the
presumption to the level of a constitutional right, 159 thereby recognizing a constitutional basis for the right of the general public to have access to criminal trials. 16 ° Since the rights of the press are generally
considered equal to those of the public, 16 1 it can be argued that Richmond Newspapers grants the press a constitutional right of access as a meNewspaper opinions, see infra notes 159-67 and accompanying text. See also Comment, Constitutional Law: Right of Access to Criminal Trials is Protected by the First
Amendment, 22 WASHBURN LJ. 380 (1983) (analyzing recent Supreme Court decisions balancing first amendment with sixth amendment concerns).
156. See Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 608-09.
157. Id. (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 589 (1965)).
158. See id. at 602 ("[o]n respondents' side is the presumption-however
gauged-in favor of public access to judicial records."); see also In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257, 266 (1948) ("This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public
trial to an accused has its roots in our English common law heritage."); Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ("A trial is a public event. What transpires in
the court room is public property."); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 361
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Of course trials must be public and the
public have a deep interest in trials.").
159. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 ("We hold that the right to
attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment
....").
160. See also Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 596 ("The Court's recent decision in
Richmond Newspapers established for the first time that the press and the general
public have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials."). For a discussion
of the Globe Newspaper and Richmond Newspapers decisions, see supra note 159 and
infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
161. See Cox, 420 U.S. at 491-92. The press serves as a medium through
which the public's right to know is facilitated. Id. Because of limited time and
resources, the public is unable to gather all the information available to it and,
therefore, needs the press to publicize what it is entitled to know. Id.; see also
Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 609 ("Since the press serves as the information-gathering agent of the public, it could not be prevented from reporting
what it had learned and what the public was entitled to know.").
As a result of the nature of the medium of the press, the exercise of its right
to access, it is submitted, has a broader impact because of wide publication.
However, within the courtroom itself, the right of access granted to the press is
no greater than that of the public, and only information available to the public
should be available to the press. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 589 (1965).
The Estes Court stated:
Once beyond the confines of the courthouse, a news-gathering agency
may publicize, within wide limits, what its representatives have heard
and seen in the courtroom. But the line is drawn at the courthouse
door; and within, a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than
those of any other member of the public.
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dium for the public.1 62 The Warner Communications Court's reasoning is
held intact because the press, through its exercise of access, is merely
facilitating a public right recognized in Richmond Newspapers. 163
The Supreme Court's decision in Globe Newspaper lends credence to
the first amendment basis of the media's claimed right of access. t 64 In
that case, the Court reiterated the existence of the public's constitutional right of access to criminal trials and specifically included the press
as enjoying that same right.' 6 5 The Globe Newspaper Court stated that
"the press and general public have a constitutional right of access to
criminal trials."' 16 6 The right of access recognized in both Richmond
Newspapers and Globe Newspaper is, in terms of attendance, naturally limited by the size of the courtroom and the inability of a large portion of
the population to attend. 16 7 Thus, it is suggested that the media's constitutional right of access as a medium for the public logically follows
from the Richmond Newspaper decision, as indicated by the Globe Newspaper
decision.
162. See Criden, 648 F.2d at 821 n.6 ("Arguably, the Richmond Newspapers
case could be viewed as supporting a right of the public to access to the tapes
through the medium of the broadcasters."). In Richmond Newspapers, Chief Justice Burger discussed the role of the media as "surrogates" for the general public: "Instead of acquiring information about trials by firsthand observation or by
word of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through
the print and electronic media. In a sense, this validates the media claim of
functioning as surrogates for the public." Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 57273; see also Cox, 420 U.S. at 491-92.
163. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 (right to attend criminal trials
is implicit in guarantees of first amendment).
164. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 603-11. The Globe Newspaper Court
stated:
The Court's recent decision in Richmond Newspapers firmly established
for the first time that the press and the general public have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials. Although there was no majority
opinion of the Court in that case, seven Justices recognized that this
right of access is embodied in the First Amendment.
Id. at 603; see also Note, supra note 103, at 1471 ("Globe buttresses the argument
for a strong presumption of access grounded in the first amendment, and undercuts previous authority to the contrary.").
165. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 603.
166. Id.
167. See Criden, 648 F.2d at 822. The Criden court stated:
The public's opportunity to observe the trial proceeding, secured
by Richmond Newspapers, is subject to certain practical limitations, and
can be taken advantage of only by those persons who have the available
time and means to be present. Thus, the public forum values emphasized in that case can be fully vindicated only if the opportunity for
personal observation is extended to persons other than those few who
can manage to attend the trial in person.
Id. Prior to the Richmond decision, the court in United States v. Mitchell spoke of
the problem of the "cramped courtroom": "the right of inspection serves to
promote equality by providing those who were and those who were not able to
gain entry to... [the] courtroom the same opportunity to hear the White House
tapes." Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1258.
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The courts that have dealt with the issue of the media's right of
access to tape recordings have analyzed the first amendment issue in
conflicting ways. Some courts have explicitly recognized a first amendment right of physical access to the tapes in question. 168 Others have
specifically refused to recognize such a right. 169 Between these two extremes are those courts that decline to rule on the constitutional question but acknowledge that the policies behind the first amendment
protections apply to the issue of physical access to tape-recorded
evidence. '

70

It is submitted that whether or not an explicit constitutional right of
access in the media to tape-recorded evidence is recognized on the authority of Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper, the policy considera-

tions articulated within the Supreme Court's recent decisions also
support a right of access. 17 1 The most significant policy behind the constitutional right to attend trials is the importance of "openness" in criminal proceedings. 17 2 Chief Justice Burger, in his plurality opinion in
Richmond Newspapers, recognized the "significant community therapeutic
168. See, e.g., In re Continental Illinois Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th
Cir. 1984) ("we recognized that this presumption [in favor of access] is of constitutional magnitude"); Associated Press v. United States Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143,

1145 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he first amendment right of access to criminal trials
also applies to pretrial proceedings."); United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230,
1233-34 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The 'right of access' is now part of the First
Amendment.").
169. See Webbe, 791 F.2d at 105 (relying on Warner Communications holding
that first amendment does not guarantee access to tapes); Beckham, 789 F.2d at
408-09, 413 (agreeing that right to copy court exhibits is not of constitutional
derivation but springs from common-law tradition); Belo, 654 F.2d at 426, 428,
432, 434 (there exists no first amendment right of access to tapes).
170. See Edwards, 672 F.2d at 1294 (recognizing that right of access is of
non-constitutional origin but acknowledging strength of common-law presumption); Criden, 648 F.2d at 820, 821 n.6 (disposing of case on non-constitutional
grounds but noting importance of public's right to open trial); Mitchell, 551 F.2d
at 1258 (stating that constitutional provisions support but do not mandate common-law right of access).
171. For a discussion of the policy considerations within the Supreme
Court's recent decisions that support a right of access, see infra notes 172-74
and accompanying text.
172. See Criden, 648 F.2d at 820-22 (openness of proceedings in interest of
both defendant and public). See generally 6J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834, 43541 (1976) ("The publicity of ajudicial proceeding.., plays an important part as
a security for testimonial trustworthiness .... "). The Supreme Court has long
recognized the importance of "openness" in the criminal setting. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606 ("the institutional value of the open criminal trial is recognized in both logic and experience"); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[openness] contribute[s] to public
understanding of the ... entire criminal justice system"); Maryland v. Baltimore

Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) ("One of the demands of a democratic society is that the public
should know what goes on in courts by being told by the press what happens
there ....").
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value" imparted by open trials. 173 This openness is especially valued in
the criminal setting in light of its deterrent effect on criminals and its
174
prophylactic effect on members of the community exposed to crime.
It is submitted that this concern for openness calls for a strong presumption in favor of access which should be denied only in the most
compelling circumstances. 175 In determining when these circumstances
exist, a court should consider the probability of infringement on the defendant's sixth amendment rights which might result from a grant of
access to taped evidence. 17 6 However, in doing so, the courts should
follow the Myers and Criden courts' analyses of the availability and effect
77
of curative devices.1
B.

The Use of Curative Devices

The chief obstacle to access, uniformly acknowledged by the courts
that have considered the issue, is the defendant's sixth amendment right
to an impartial trial. 178 The concern over prejudicial impact relates to
173. 448 U.S. at 570. ChiefJustice Burger noted that openness has "long
been recognized as an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American trial." Id.
at 569. He explained that the open judicial process serves an important "prophylactic purpose," providing an outlet for "community concern, hostility and
emotion." Id. at 571. Openness also serves an important educative function in
that it contributes to public understanding of the law and the criminal justice
system. Id. at 572-73.
174. Id. at 570-72. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the plurality in Richmond Newspapers, noted that when a shocking crime occurs there is a reaction of
outrage by the affected community. Id. at 571. The interaction between the
public trial and the community's reaction was referred to as a "community catharsis." Id. ChiefJustice Burger stressed the fact that this catharsis could not
occur "in the dark." Id.
175. See Myers, 635 F.2d at 952. The Myers court suggested that, if it can be
shown that broadcast of the videotape evidence will lead to an infringement of a
defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial, denial of access is justified. Id.
at 953. However, the court stated that this infringement must not be speculative
and that the use of curative devices can be heavily relied on to minimize the
possibility of prejudice. Id. at 953-54.
176. See, e.g., Criden, 648 F.2d at 826-28 (reversing district court order that
denied application for access based primarily on fair-trial concerns). The Criden
court referred to a defendant's right to a fair trial as the "most serious factor" in
deciding the question of access to videotape evidence. Id. at 826. For further
discussion of the sixth amendment in the context of media access, see infra notes
188-201 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Criden opinion, see
supra notes 78-94 and accompanying text.

177. See Criden, 648 F.2d at 827-28; Myers, 635 F.2d at 953-54. For a discussion of the approaches of the Myers and Criden courts, see supra notes 64-94 and

accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Edwards, 672 F.2d at 1295 ("Clearly it is appropriate-indeed

necessary-for a court to consider how the granting of an application for access
to evidence.., will affect the defendant's right to a fair proceeding."); Belo, 654

F.2d at 431 ("It is better to err, if err we must, on the side of generosity in the
protection of a defendant's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury."); Criden,
648 F.2d at 827 ("defendants' due process right to a fair trial is the linchpin of
our criminal justice system."); Myers, 635 F.2d at 953 ("of greater concern is the
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unfairness to the defendant during both the ongoing trial at which the
79
request for access is made and at any imminent trials.'
During a trial in which access to evidence is sought, a judge has at
his disposal the use of cautionary instructions and sequestration of the
jury as tools to eliminate potential prejudice to the defendant which
might result from such access.18 0 The use of cautionary instructions has
long been considered a useful and indispensable instrument ofjury control. 18 1 Such instructions enable ajudge to clarify to the jury its role in
the proceedings and to eliminate any misconceptions caused by publicity about the case. 182 While the possibility remains that jurors, despite
risk to a fair trial of the three Myers defendants and others facing trial on other
Abscam indictments.").
The importance of fair-trial rights has long been recognized by the
Supreme Court. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 508
(1984) ("No right ranks higher than the right of the accused to a fair trial.");
Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Att'y Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (jury's decision
must be "induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any
outside influence whether of private talk or public print").
179. See Note, supra note 6, at 459. The Note's author states: "Possibly the
greatest concern in the decision whether to permit rebroadcast of video evidence is the risk of infringing upon the right to a fair trial of present or prospective defendants." Id.
180. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1976). The
Nebraska Press Court expressed approval of the use of "emphatic and clear instructions on the sworn duty of each juror to decide the issues only on evidence
presented in open court." Id. at 564. The Court also noted the availability and
use of sequestration as an alternative to restraining the publication of evidence.
Id.; see also Myers, 635 F.2d at 953 ("The... Judge ...was entitled to rely on the

jury's observance of his admonition to avoid exposure to reports of the trial in
the news media."). For a general discussion of the use of cautionary instructions, see Comment, The ImpartialJury-Twentieth Century Dilemma: Some Solutions
to the Conflict Between Free Press and Fair Trial, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 306, 316 (1966)

[hereinafter Comment, The ImpartialJury]("Thejudge fulfills [his] duty by giving
cautionary instructions."). For a detailed commentary on the use of sequestra-

tion as a curative device, see Comment, Sequestration: A Possible Solution to the Free
Press-FairTrial Dilemma, 23 AM. U.L. REV. 923, 955 (1974) [hereinafter Com-

ment, Sequestration] ("[I]n those cases which can be said to be 'sensational,' sequestration, despite its weaknesses, does provide, in concert with other
remedies, the best method available to protect the conflicting rights of freedom
of press and fair trial.").
181. See Note, Fair Trial/FreePress: The Court's Dilemma, 17

WASHBURN

L.J.

125, 138 (1977) ("In most instances, the trial court will be able to deal effectively
with the problem of adverse publicity by cautioning the jurors to avoid exposure
to such publicity." (citation omitted)). It is generally considered part of the
judge's duty to give cautionary instructions regularly to jurors whenever the case
is such that the jury separates before reaching a verdict. See Comment, Sequestration, supra note 180, at 932 ("If the court allows the jury to separate once impanelled, the trial judge will regularly admonish it not to read about, listen to
conversations concerning, or discuss the case during the trial until its discharge." (footnotes omitted)). For a transcript of a model cautionary instruction, see Standards Relating to the Administration of CriminalJustice Standard 8-3.6(e)

(Approved Draft 1978) [hereinafter Standards].
182. See generally Comment, The ImpartialJury, supra note 180, at 316.
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the court's admonition, would be unduly prejudiced because of publicity
resulting from the inspection and copying of admitted evidence, this
possibility, it is submitted, is sufficiently remote as to pose no significant
83
risk to a defendant's fair trial.'
Should cautionary instructions to the jury be deemed ineffectual,
sequestration of the jury exists as a viable alternative. Sequestration is
generally considered to be reserved for the exceptional cases, 18 4 those
in which mere admonition to the jury will not suffice. 185 Thus, absent a
showing of exceptional circumstances creating a "circus atmosphere" in
the courtroom, a cautionary instruction to the jury should be considered
sufficient to dispel any discriminatory impact on the jurors caused by the
release of evidence to the media.18 6 Should the circumstances be shown
to justify sequestration, it can be employed to ensure insulation of the
jury from the negative effects of publicity of the evidence, thus preserv18 7
ing an impartial jury for the defendant.
183. See Edwards, 672 F.2d at 1296 (citing Myers, 635 F.2d at 953). The
Edwards court stated:
[A] court would ordinarily conclude that the possibility that the jurors,
despite the admonition, would be unduly prejudiced because of publicity resulting from the inspection and copying of evidence which has already been held admissible is sufficiently remote as to pose no
significant risk to a fair trial.
Id. Other courts have noted that there is no reason to believe that cautionary
instructions will be ignored by jurors. See Myers, 635 F.2d at 953 (possibility that
jurors, despite admonition, might see tapes of excerpts unflattering to appellants again on television did not pose significant risk to fair trial); United States
v. Mouzin, 559 F. Supp. 463, 467 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (confidence that jurors will
obey instructions of court is underpinning of our criminal justice system);
United States v. Pageau, 535 F. Supp. 1031, 1033-34 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) ("it cannot be assumed that jurors will ignore the Court's instructions to render a verdict solely upon the evidence presented in the courtroom").
184. See Standards, supra note 181, at Standard 8-3.6(b) (sequestration used

only if "there is a substantial likelihood that highly prejudicial matters will come

to the attention of the jurors"). Although sequestration insulates jurors only
after they are sworn, it also enhances the likelihood of dissipating the impact of
pretrial publicity and emphasizes the elements of the jurors' oaths. Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976). The Supreme Court in Richmond
Newspapers expressed its approval of the use of sequestration as an alternative to
the denial of access. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581.
185. See Standards, supra note 181, at Standard 8-3.6(b).
186. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349-63 (1966) (extremely high
level of publicity made it extraordinarily difficult to impanel ajury and created a
"circus atmosphere" in courtroom). There are, concededly, a few extreme situations in which cautionary instructions are not effective. See, e.g., United States
v. Murray, 784 F.2d 188, 189 (6th Cir. 1986) (in some circumstances, a cautionary instruction is "close to an instruction to unring a bell"); United States v.
Schiff, 612 F.2d 73, 83 (2d Cir. 1979) (instruction may, at times, be insufficient).
187. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text. For an example of a
situation in which cautionary instructions were insufficient and sequestration

should have been employed as a device to protect the defendant's fair-trial
rights, see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). In Sheppard, there was an
extraordinary amount of publicity surrounding the prosecution of the defendant
for the second-degree murder of his pregnant wife. Id. at 335. The trial judge
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Apart from prejudice to the defendant during an ongoing trial, concern for the defendant's fair-trial rights is greatest in situations where
future trials related to the initial proceedings are either scheduled or
anticipated.' 8 8 Frequently, a denial of access at the trial level is predicated on the judge's prediction of difficulty in impanelling an impartial
jury. 189 An impartial juror is defined as one who is "indifferent as he
stands unsworne [sic]."' 9 0 Knowledge of the facts and issues of a case
does not necessarily prove bias.1 9 1 Instead, a biased person must have a
preconceived opinion as to the issues in the case. 19 2 While it is true that
the impact of a television broadcast increases the number of people exposed to pretrial publicity, 193 as the Second Circuit in Myers pointed
allowed the media to sit within the bar and lost his ability to adequately oversee
the proceedings. Id. at 355. The jury was allowed to witness several radio,
newspaper and television broadcasts of coverage of the case. Id. at 353. The
jurors were further exposed to telephone calls from the public due to the publication of their names and addresses. Id. The jury was not sequestered. Id. Essentially, "the jurors were thrust into the role of celebrities by the judge's failure
to insulate them from reporters and photographers." Id. As a result of these
circumstances, Sheppard's fair-trial rights were violated and the Supreme Court
granted his petition for habeas corpus. Id. at 363.
188. See Myers, 635 F.2d at 953; see also Note, supra note 6, at 461 ("Of far
greater concern is the effect which broadcast may have upon trials of implicated
defendants, or upon retrials."). The problem at this point goes beyond the prejudicial impact on the existing impanelled jury to the difficulty of impanelling a
new jury for the subsequent trial. See id. The Myers court stressed the fact that in
the trial at hand, the jurors had already seen the evidence within the proceedings
themselves and are admonished to avoid rebroadcasts. Myers, 635 F.2d at 953.
In contrast, when dealing with the fair-trial rights of a defendant awaiting trial,
the issue becomes whether an impartial jury can be impanelled after extensive
broadcast of evidence. Id.
189. See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854, 861 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
("Notwithstanding the vast amount of publicity which has already been accorded
this case, there remains a possibility that an untainted jury may yet be
obtainable.").
190. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (citing E. COKE, COMMENTARY
UPON LIrLETON 155(b) (19th ed. 1853)).
191. Id. at 722-23. In discussing the qualifications of an impartial juror, the
Supreme Court stated that "[ilt is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court."
Id. at 723 (citations omitted). For an in-depth analysis of the difference between
knowledge and prejudice, see Hassett, A Jury's Pre-Trial Knowledge in Historical
Perspective: The DistinctionBetween Pre-TrialInformation and "Preudicial"Publicity, 43
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 155-68 (1980).
192. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961). The Supreme Court
distinguished between a juror who may have some knowledge of the facts and
issues in a case from one with a preconceived opinion or "strong and deep impressions." Id. at 722. The latter, the Court found, clearly cannot be impartial.
Id.
193. See Myers, 635 F.2d at 953. The Myers court stated: "We do not doubt
the premise of this claim that televising the tapes will greatly increase the
number of people with knowledge of their content beyond those already aware
of the videotaped events through reading press accounts and viewing television
newscasts." Id.; see alsoJenrette,653 F.2d at 616. TheJenrette court stated: "We
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out, the public's awareness of news is frequently overestimated. 19 4 In
the Myers case, the publicity surrounding the Abscam prosecutions did
not result in a large percentage of biased potential jurors. 19 5 Instead,
approximately half of those summoned for jury selection had knowledge
of the events and "only a handful had more than cursory
96
knowledge."1
In addition, courts have recognized that publicity is germane to a
criminal trial and is necessarily a part of it.19

7

In light of the amount of

publicity that naturally flows from a sensational criminal trial, the enhanced effect of video rebroadcast has been termed "incremental."' 98
In fact, the Supreme Court has held that the live broadcast of criminal
trials themselves is not inherently unconstitutional. 199 Rather, the
Court suggested that trial courts rely primarily on the use of voir dire
examination 20 0 to eliminate potential prejudicial impact on defendagree that broadcasting the video and audio tapes might increase the percentage
of the potential venire which possesses some knowledge of the facts and issues,
and even the evidence, involved in the case." Id.
194. 635 F.2d at 953 ("Defendants, as well as the news media, frequently
overestimate the extent of the public's awareness of news."); see alsoJenrette,653
F.2d at 616 ("a significant percentage of the potential jury pool will not see or
hear the tapes, or if they do, will quickly forget much of what they saw").
195. 635 F.2d at 953.
196. Id. The Myers court went on to state that "[e]ven the intensive publicity surrounding the events of Watergate, very likely the most widely reported
crime of the past decade, did not prevent the selection of jurors without such
knowledge of the events as would prevent them from serving impartially." Id.
(citing United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 61-63 & n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977)). In the Watergate trial, a poll conducted by the
defendants revealed that 93% of the venire was aware of the indictments.
United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Yet the Haldeman
court, after reviewing the voir dire record, found that the jurors were not in fact
biased and the convictions were upheld. Id. at 140; see also Note, supra note 103,
at 1466. For a further discussion of the often scant knowledge of jurors, see
United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 436-37 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc) (the
"individual questioning [of the veniremen] indicated that most knew little about
the case, few remembered even a single detail, and none had formed an opinion
as to the guilt or innocence of the defendants"), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 911 (1975);
United States v. Kahaner, 204 F. Supp. 921, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 317 F.2d
459 (2d Cir.) ("[Firequently ... prospective jurors show little recall of past
widely publicized matters; fears that jurors have formed opinions often prove
groundless."), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836 (1963).
197. See Criden, 648 F.2d at 824. The court noted that publicity, rather than
favoring rejection of the application for access, may in fact support its grant,
absent compelling reasons to the contrary. Id.
198. Id. at 825. In Criden, the Third Circuit found the trial court's concerns
about the incremental effect of rebroadcast publicity to be unconvincing, given
that defendants were themselves public figures and their conduct was already
the subject of national publicity and comment. Id.
199. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 571-74 (1981).
200. See Note, supra note 181, at 135-38. Voir dire examination refers to a
procedure whereby potential jurors are questioned in order, inter alia, to eliminate those who have been prejudiced by pre-trial publicity. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol32/iss1/5

34

Starczewski: Media Access to Tape-Recorded Evidence in Criminal Trials

1987]

NOTE

217

ants.2 0 1 It is submitted that there is a greater potential for prejudice in
the rebroadcast of an entire trial than in the broadcast of a piece of
videotape evidence. Thus, if voir dire has been recognized as sufficient
to control prejudice with live broadcast, it can certainly be relied upon
to prevent prejudice to a defendant resulting from the rebroadcast of
evidence.
With the Supreme Court consistently advocating the use of voir dire
as a significant curative device, 20 2 the Myers, Criden and Jenrette courts
concluded that there is no compelling reason to believe that this device
will be ineffective in the context of evidentiary access. 203 In fact, all
three courts used the Supreme Court's approval of the use of voir dire
to support the proposition that voir dire serves as a mechanism to use in
to know
balancing a defendant's fair-trial rights against the public's20right
4
and, from there, the media's right of access to evidence.
201. 449 U.S. at 574-75. The Supreme Court in Chandler stated that the
possibility of prejudice due to the jury's exposure to publicity is not sufficient to
justify banning the live broadcast of trials. Id. Instead, the Court found that

courts have developed curative devices to prevent the tainting ofjury deliberations. Id. at 574.
202. See United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 49, 51 (Cas. No. 14,692) (1807)

(written by Marshall, C.J.). Justice Marshall's use of voir dire in Burr was noted
with approval by the Court in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 548
(1976). The Nebraska Press court pointed out that since the time of the Burr decision, modern means of communication have added to the impact of publicity on
a defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. However, the Court stated that "publicity-even pervasive, adverse publicity-does not inevitably lead to an unfair
trial." Id. at 554. The Court suggested four ways of preventing prejudice as
alternatives to restraining publication. Id. at 563. One of the significant methods stated was "searching questioning of prospective jurors." Id. at 564; see also
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981). The Supreme Court once again gave
its approval to voir dire in Chandler, stating:
The risk of juror prejudice is present in any publication of a trial, but
the appropriate safeguard against such prejudice is the defendant's
right to demonstrate that the media's coverage of this case-be it
printed or broadcast-compromised the ability of the particular jury
that heard the case to adjudicate fairly.
Id. at 575.
203. SeeJenrette, 653 F.2d at 617 ("to the extent that some members of the
potential jury pool are so affected by the broadcasting of the tapes ... voir dire
has long been recognized as an effective method of rooting out such bias, especially when conducted in a careful and thoroughgoing manner" (footnotes omitted)). For a further discussion of Jenrette, see supra notes 95-102 and
accompanying text. See also Criden, 648 F.2d at 827 ("the appropriate course to
follow when the spectre of prejudicial publicity is raised is not automatically to
deny access but to rely primarily on the curative device of voir dire examination"); Myers, 635 F.2d at 953 ("[V]oir dire examination still remains a sufficient
device to eliminate from jury service those so affected by exposure to pre-trial
publicity that they cannot fairly decide issues of guilt or innocence."). For a
further discussion of Criden, see supra notes 78-94 and accompanying text. For a
further discussion of Myers, see supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
204. SeeJenrette, 653 F.2d at 617, n.46 (citing Nebraska Press); Criden, 648
F.2d at 827-28 (quoting Chandler);Myers, 635 F.2d at 953 (citing Nebraska Press).
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The courts of appeals in Belo and Edwards, however, rejected the
asserted effectiveness of voir dire. The Fifth Circuit in Belo assumed that
this remedy had been judged ineffective at the trial level.2 0 5 The Seventh Circuit
in Edwards stated that the device merely made the case
"closer,"' 20 6 and denied access in spite of the trial judge's finding that an
impartial jury could be impanelled. 20 7 The courts of appeals in Beckham
and Webbe simply accepted the trial judge's determination that the use of
voir dire would be ineffective. 20 8 These courts, following the lead of
Belo, expressed a reluctance to review the judge's findings as to the effectiveness of voir dire. 20 9 It is submitted, however, that the Belo court's
deference to the trial court is misplaced. The Third Circuit in Criden
emphasized the difference between appellate review of a decision dependent wholly on first-hand trial observation and review of a decision
2 10
based on the relevance and weight of the factors determining access.
21
Although the first is afforded very deferential review, the latter is not. '
It is submitted that, even in highly publicized cases, it does not take
an extraordinary amount of time to identify through voir dire examination the potentially biased jurors. In the Watergate case, after a year of
widespread publicity, voir dire was completed in eight days. 2 12 More205. Belo, 654 F.2d at 432. The court stated: "We cannot assume trial
court ignorance of these familiar devices, and we will not assume inattention to
their availability." Id. For a further discussion of Belo, see supra notes 124-35
and accompanying text.
206. Edwards, 672 F.2d at 1296. Although the availability of voir dire made
the case "closer," the court nevertheless found the problem of the "tainting" of
the current and expected trial through the grant of access to the media persuasive. Id.
207. Id.
208. Webbe, 791 F.2d at 107 ("The district court also properly could have
considered whether the administrative difficulties in providing access to the
tapes... would have adversely affected the progress of the trial."); Beckham, 789
F.2d at 415 ("The district court found that the curative powers... [of] voir dire
... would be insufficient.... His decision may appear overly cautious, but the
primary responsibility for the orderly administration of a criminal trial rested on
his shoulders."). For a further discussion of Webbe, see supra notes 146-51 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of Beckham, see supra notes 136-45
and accompanying text.
209. Beckham, 789 F.2d at 415 ("We cannot ignore that the trial judge has
primary responsibility to provide the fair trial."); Webbe, 791 F.2d at 107 ("We
are ill-equipped to second-guess [the trial judge's] determination as how to best
accommodate the interests of the parties involved .... "); Belo, 654 F.2d at 432
("we remain in a poor position from which to second guess the trial judge").
210. Criden, 648 F.2d at 818. The court stated that "[w]here the basis for
commitment of a decision to a trial court's discretion is not dependent on its
observation or familiarity with the course of the litigation, there are less compelling reasons for limited appellate review." Id.
211. Id.
212. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en
banc). In addition, in the case ofJohn Hinckley,Jr., ajury was impanelled in five
days despite the film of the shooting being broadcast repeatedly on television.
See N.Y. Times, May 4, 1982, at A22, col. 1.
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over, in cases where compelling reasons to assume an ineffective voir
dire exist, change of venue and continuance are available as additional
2 13
measures of protection.
V.

CONCLUSION

The question whether the media has a right of physical access to
tape-recorded evidence and the nature of this right is in dispute. 21 4 The
issue presents consitutional questions involving both the first and the
sixth amendments. 2 15 Several federal courts of appeals have addressed
the issue and reached conflicting results. 2 16 Although some courts apply a strong presumption in favor of access, 2 17 others rely more strongly
on the trial court's determination and afford the right of access less
2 18
significance.
It is submitted that the long-recognized and highly effective curative
220
devices, such as cautionary instructions, 2 19 sequestration of the jury
22
1
and voir dire examination,
should be explored by the trial judge, who
should make every effort to avoid denial of access. It is further submitted that the courts of appeals, absent an articulation by the trial judge of
213. Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 617 n.45. TheJenrette court stated: "In the event
voir dire reveals insurmountable prejudice, of course, additional measures exist,
such as the granting of a continuance or a change in venue." Id.; see also Myers,
635 F.2d at 953 n.9. The Myers court stated:
If voir dire examination should reveal that at a particular time and location there is genuine difficulty assembling an impartial jury, or even
that the effort to do so risks unduly narrowing the cross-section from
which the trial jury will be selected, trial courts can take additional
measures through the granting of a continuance or change of venue.
Id. The Supreme Court expressed its approval of the use of continuance and
change of venue as protections of a defendant's fair-trial rights in Sheppard v.
Maxwell. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). The Sheppard court stated that "where there is a
reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial,
the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity." Id. at 363.
214. For a discussion of the background of the media's right of access and
the dispute surrounding this right, see supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
215. For a discussion of the role of the first amendment in the context of
media access to tape-recorded evidence, see supra notes 154-74 and accompanying text.
216. For a list of the courts of appeals that have addressed this issue, see
supra note 8.
217. For a discussion of the courts in favor of access, see supra notes 64-122
and accompanying text.
218. For a discussion of the courts refusing to apply a strong presumption
in favor of access, see supra notes 124-51 and accompanying text.
219. For a discussion of the use of cautionary instructions, see supra notes
180-213 and accompanying text.
220. For a discussion of the use of sequestration of the jury, see supra notes
184-87 and accompanying text.
221. For a discussion of the use of voir dire, see supra notes 200-09 and
accompanying text.
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compelling reasons to believe that neither voir dire nor any alternative
will eliminate prejudicial impact, should allow media access to taped evidence in criminal trials. Rebroadcast of videotape and audiotape evidence greatly enhances the public's right to know through the medium
of the press. Therefore, unless extremely inappropriate, 2 22 tapes
should be disseminated to those broadcasters who request them and
wish to make them public. The significance of the public's right to know
and the value of "openness" in the criminal setting justify a strong presumption in favor of access.
Lisa Kakaty Starczewski
222. See, e.g., In re Application of KSTP Television, 504 F. Supp. 360 (D.
Minn. 1980) (court denied television station's request to copy and broadcast
videotapes which portrayed conduct of defendant prior to rape of kidnap victim). Tapes of this nature fall within the proscription enunciated in Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598.
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